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INTRODUCTION 
The Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision prompted a storm of media atten-
tion, with some predicting the end of large-scale class actions.1  On 
the one-year anniversary of the Dukes decision, legislation was pro-
posed to reverse the “damage” done by the Dukes decision.2  The deci-
sion is still very much in the public’s mind, and it is viewed as having 
damaged workers’ ability to hold employers accountable for discrim-
inatory employment policies. 
 
 ! J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 2006, Middlebury Col-
lege.  I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Catherine Struve, for her guidance and 
insightful feedback on drafts of this Comment, as well as the editors and Board of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Journal of Constitutional Law for their assistance 
throughout the editing process.  
 1 See Kimberly Atkins, The new class of 2011:  U.S. Supreme Court defeats didn’t end class actions, 
but they did change them, LAWYERS USA ONLINE (July 26, 2011), 
http://lawyersusaonline.com/blog/2011/07/26/the-new-class-of-2011/ (articulating 
Professor Malveaux’s belief that “[t]he class action ‘is not dead, but it certainly was in-
jured by the Court this year’”); see also Katherine Kimpel, Wal-Mart ruling disarms employees 
in David vs. Goliath cases, DAILY BUSINESS REV., July 18, 2011 (observing that with the Wal-
Mart v. Dukes decision, “the Supreme Court . . . effectively disarmed employees, taking 
back the class action slingshot by inventing a new, virtually impossible standard for class 
certification” and that “[t]he perverse result of this new standard is that the larger the 
corporation gets, the harder it will be for an employee to succeed”); Piper Hoffman, 
Court to women:  You’re on your own, NEWSDAY, June 22, 2011, available at 
http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/hoffman-court-to-women-you-re-on-your-own-
1.2977422 (describing the Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision as “a major loss for women, minori-
ties, senior citizens, the disabled and any other group that tends to get the short end of 
the stick in the workplace”).  
 2 Press Release, The Lawyer’s Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, House and Senate Intro-
duce Legislation to Restore Workers’ Rights, Reverse Damage Resulting From Wal-
Mart Supreme Court Decision (June 20, 2012), available at www.lawyerscommittee.org/pr
ojects/employment_discrimination/press_releases?id=0241. 
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Justice Scalia began the Dukes decision by observing that it was 
“one of the most expansive class actions ever.”3  Dukes held that the 
certification of a class of female employees of Wal-Mart was incon-
sistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2).4  
The class action involved claims of sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII.  The one and a half million current and former female em-
ployees of Wal-Mart sought injunctive relief and declaratory relief to 
prevent Wal-Mart from continuing its allegedly discriminatory pay 
and promotion practices.5  The plaintiff class also sought monetary 
damages in the form of a backpay award of lost wages and earnings 
due to Wal-Mart’s alleged discrimination.6 
In the portion of the decision most frequently discussed, Dukes 
provided clarification on the commonality requirement in Rule 
23(a)(2) and made it harder for a potential class to meet the re-
quirements.7  Dukes also provided commentary on the question of 
whether claims for monetary relief can be included with claims for 
injunctive relief.  Despite having a history of considering this ques-
tion but not fully resolving it, the Supreme Court yet again8 skirted 
the question.  The growing circuit split on this particular issue—
whether claims for monetary relief are ever consistent with certifica-
tion under Rule 23(b)(2)—had presented a perfect opportunity for 
resolution.  Instead of resolving the issue, the Supreme Court, in dic-
ta, simply raised serious doubt that there were any forms of incidental 
monetary relief that could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) without 
violating the Due Process Clause.9 
If true, this possibility would create an enormous roadblock to Ti-
tle VII employment discrimination claims, which have historically 
been brought under Rule 23(b)(2) and have also included awards for 
backpay.  To better understand the implications for class actions go-
ing forward, it is helpful to first examine why the Supreme Court lim-
ited—and potentially removed altogether—the possibility of class cer-
tification under Rule 23(b)(2) when monetary damages are also in-
 
 3 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011). 
 4 Id. at 2556–57. 
 5 Id. at 2547. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 2556–57.  
 8 See infra Parts I.C. and II.B.  
 9 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (“In the context of a class action predominantly for money dam-
ages we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process. . . . While we 
have never held that to be so where the monetary claims do not predominate, the serious 
possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to in-
clude the monetary claims here.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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involved.  Was it simply the sheer size of this particular class, or was 
there something more? 
This Comment examines the Dukes decision through the lens of 
due process.  Based on the history of Rule 23 and the way in which 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the requirements of due process 
in the context of class actions, there is a lack of due process protec-
tion for the absent class members in Rule 23(b)(2) when those ac-
tions involve monetary damages.  Part I takes up these issues.  In light 
of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the history of Rule 23 and its 
structure, the limitations on monetary remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) 
classes can—and should—be understood as being driven by underly-
ing due process concerns.  The Supreme Court’s lack of a blanket 
prohibition on all monetary relief from Rule 23(b)(2) class actions is 
consistent with the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s implied 
understanding of courts’ ability to determine due process require-
ments on a case-by-case basis for Rule 23(b)(2) classes.  This analysis 
is presented in Part II. 
Finally, what are the implications of due process concerns driving 
the limitation on monetary remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions?  
How should these due process concerns be accounted for in em-
ployment discrimination class actions?  What impact does Dukes have 
on the other routes to resolving these types of aggregate disputes?  
Part III begins this assessment by presenting the approach taken by 
the Dukes plaintiffs in the subsequent litigation as a case study.  Next, 
two alternative approaches that address the due process concerns are 
briefly explored with the aim of beginning the discussion on how to 
accommodate the due process concerns underlying Dukes’ limitation 
on monetary remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) actions. 
I.  CLASS ACTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 
Parties may not be bound to a judgment in which they were not a 
party.10  Class actions, however, are one of the few exceptions to this 
general rule.11  While this exception is fundamentally in tension with 
the general requirements of due process, class actions are nonethe-
 
 10 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general application in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a liti-
gation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party 
by service of process.”). 
 11 Id. at 41 (“To these general rules there is a recognized exception that . . . the judgment in 
a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may bind 
members of the class or those represented who were not made parties to it.”). 
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less an important part of the American litigation system.  Class ac-
tions are crucial to vindicating rights that would not otherwise be 
vindicated, for example, in discrimination cases where the primary 
relief sought is to prevent the entity from continuing to discriminate. 
Because class actions may bind parties who are not even aware of 
the litigation, class actions raise a host of potential issues related to 
the Due Process Clause.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23, 
which governs class actions, requires only that absent class members 
be adequately represented.12  The Supreme Court has affirmed that 
this is the only protection required by the Due Process Clause in class 
actions seeking primarily injunctive relief.13  When a class seeks both 
equitable and monetary relief, as is frequently the case in employ-
ment discrimination cases, Rule 23 as it currently exists and is applied 
by the Supreme Court, may not adequately protect the due process 
rights of absent class members.14  The due process analysis is further 
complicated by the preclusive effect of the class judgment on the ab-
sent class members.15  When taking into account the history of Rule 
23, judicial concerns, and the interaction of preclusion doctrine with 
Rule 23, there may be a lack of due process protection for absent 
class members in classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2) 
when the class also includes claims for monetary relief.  Title VII em-
ployment discrimination cases are a common example of this type of 
class action. 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Rule 23(b)(2) Classes 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions.16  Class 
actions allow plaintiffs to pool claims that would otherwise not be liti-
gated due to their small size or where joinder of all interested parties 
would be impractical.17  A proposed class must satisfy the four pre-
requisites in Rule 23(a):  numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy.18 
 
 12 See infra Part I.A. 
 13 See infra Part I.B. 
 14 See infra Part I.C. 
 15 See infra Part I.D. 
 16 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 17 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Modern plaintiff 
class actions . . . permit[] litigation of a suit involving common questions when there are 
too many plaintiffs for proper joinder” and may also permit “the plaintiffs to pool claims 
which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”). 
 18 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (defining the four prerequisites:  “numerosity” requires that the class 
be sufficiently large as to make joinder impractical; “commonality” requires that the 
named parties and absent class members share at least one common issue of law or fact; 
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The proposed class must next satisfy the requirements of one of 
the three subdivisions of 23(b).19  Rule 23(b)(1) encompasses class 
actions where multiple actions would risk either inconsistent out-
comes or would “substantially impair” other class members’ ability to 
protect their interests.20  Rule 23(b)(2), the focus of this Comment, 
requires that the relief sought be primarily injunctive and be applica-
ble to the class as a whole.21  Finally, Rule 23(b)(3), which is the most 
inclusive of the three types of classes, requires that there be common 
“questions of law or fact” that predominate over individual issues and 
that class adjudication be “superior to other available methods” of ad-
judicating the controversy.22 
A classic example of a Rule 23(b)(2) class is a civil rights case, 
where the class is suing to prevent an entity or person from continu-
ing its discriminatory policies.23  Historically, Title VII employment 
discrimination cases have used Rule 23(b)(2) to bring employment 
discrimination actions.  Title VII cases “typically involve[] allegations 
that [an] employer [has] engaged in a pattern and practice of inten-
tional discrimination” and are often handled in two phases.24  In the 
first, the liability phase, the employer’s liability as to its allegedly dis-
criminatory employment practices is determined, and injunctive re-
lief is granted if discriminatory practices are found; in the second, the 
remedial phase, remedies for individual members of the class are de-
 
“typicality” requires that the claims of the named parties are typical of those of the absent 
class members; and “adequacy” requires that the named parties adequately represent the 
interests of the absent class members). 
 19 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 20 A class action may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) if separate actions risk generating 
inconsistent outcomes in the individual actions, which would potentially hold the de-
fendant to incompatible standards of conduct.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).  A class action 
may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) if individual adjudication by one member of the 
class would “substantially impair” the ability of the other class members to protect their 
interests.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 21 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (requiring that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused 
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole”). 
 22 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1966) (explaining that Rule 23(b)(2) “does 
not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predomi-
nantly to money damages”).  The advisory committee notes also observe that the civil-
rights field is an illustrative example of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, but notes that Rule 
“[23](b)(2) is not limited to civil-rights cases.”  Id. 
 24 Daniel F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
2001 BYU L. REV. 305, 312 (2001).  My description of Title VII oversimplifies the reality.  
For a more detailed discussion of Title VII and the impact of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
which changed the type of remedies available to plaintiffs, thereby creating complications 
with certifying Title VII cases under Rule 23(b)(2), see generally id. at 312–15. 
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termined–often monetary damages such as backpay.25  Courts have 
allowed the inclusion of backpay awards because they have been 
viewed as flowing from the alleged discrimination itself, thus making 
it difficult to disentangle from the injunctive relief sought.26  The 
plaintiffs in Dukes similarly sought an injunction to stop Wal-Mart’s 
alleged discriminatory pay and promotion practices, along with back-
pay damages.27 
The first two classes of subdivision 23(b), 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), 
are distinguishable from the third, 23(b)(3), in terms of the right to 
and ability of absent class members to remove themselves from the 
litigation.28  For this reason, the first two classes are commonly re-
ferred to as the mandatory classes.  Absent class members in Rule 
23(b)(3) classes have the right to opt out of the litigation and also 
must be given notice of the pending class action.29  This distinction 
between the mandatory classes and Rule 23(b)(3) classes is made on 
the basis of “class cohesiveness,” which theoretically makes represen-
tation by named plaintiffs more likely to be adequate in the mandato-
ry classes.30  Further, the lack of opt-out rights for absent class mem-
bers in the mandatory classes has been rationalized on the basis of 
these injuries being “group interest injuries,” meaning that, given the 
 
 25 See Piar, supra note 24, at 312–13. 
 26 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW:  AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 illus. 5 (2010) 
(discussing divisible and indivisible remedies in the context of preclusion doctrine and 
explaining that courts “should consider whether aggregate treatment of any common is-
sues concerning Defendant’s liability will determine, in practical effect, the availability 
and method for the distribution of back pay,” because if it does, the claims for backpay 
should be treated on an aggregate basis); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Damages and Other Reme-
dies In Employment Cases, in AM. LAW INST. & AM. BAR ASS’N, DAMAGES IN EMPLOYMENT 
CASES 271, 290 (2008) (“Prevailing parties . . . are entitled to back wages in the amounts 
they would have earned but for the . . . discrimination.”).  For further discussion, see infra 
note 118. 
 27 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011). 
 28 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A); see also Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, 
Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1588 
(2007) (explaining that in (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(2) classes, participation in the 
class is “mandatory,” whereas in a (b)(3) class, members have the option to opt out of the 
proceeding). 
 29 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“[T]he court must direct to class members the best notice 
that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members 
who can be identified through reasonable effort.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (stating 
“that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion”). 
 30 See Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1155 n.8 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Although the 
interests of the different members of a (b)(2) class are by no means identical the substan-
tial cohesion of those interests makes it likely that representative members can adequately 
represent the interests of absent members . . . .” (quoting Comment, Notice in Rule 
23(b)(2) Class Actions for Monetary Relief:  Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1236, 1253–54 (1980))). 
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nature of the claim, the defendant must necessarily treat all class 
members the same.31  In contrast, Rule 23(b)(3) classes involve indi-
vidualized monetary relief, which makes the class less homogenous 
and introduces conflict of interest problems within the class.32  With 
individualized monetary relief, opt-out rights are necessary to protect 
the minimum due process rights of the absent class members, in this 
case, the right to pursue their claim for monetary damages individu-
ally.33 
Rule 23 incorporates specific provisions to address due process 
concerns.  All three types of classes are protected by the adequacy re-
quirement in subdivision 23(a).34  Rule 23(b)(3) classes, as discussed 
above, have notice and opt-out rights.35  In addition, Rule 23 grants 
courts the discretion to direct that notice be given to absent class 
members in the mandatory classes.36  Absent class members in the 
mandatory classes are afforded additional due process protection 
when a class settlement is proposed:  all proposed settlements must 
be approved by the court and notice must be given to all affected 
class members.37 
Thus, adequate representation is the only requirement in the text 
of Rule 23 itself that helps ensure absent class members’ due process 
rights in the mandatory classes.  Adequate representation requires 
only that the representative plaintiffs “fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the [whole] class”38 and that class counsel “fairly and 
adequately represent[s] the interests of the class.”39  There is no re-
quirement in the text of Rule 23 that an absent class member be 
 
 31 See Rima N. Daniels, Monetary Damages in Mandatory Classes:  When Should Opt-Out Rights Be 
Allowed?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 499, 504 (2005). 
 32 See id. at 504–05. 
 33 See id. 
 34 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (stating that “the representative parties [must] fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class”). 
 35 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must 
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, in-
cluding individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable ef-
fort.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (stating that notice to (b)(3) classes must clearly 
explain “that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion”). 
 36 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the 
court may direct appropriate notice to the class.”). 
 37 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (requiring, for all proposed settlements, that the court “direct 
notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the pro-
posal”); see also Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class 
Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 388 (1988) (discussing Federal Rule 23 and the 
protections afforded absent class members). 
 38 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 39 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4). 
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aware of the litigation; because of this, adequate representation is a 
weak form of protection.  Representative plaintiffs and class counsel 
have incentives to try to certify a proposed class action under Rule 
23(b)(2) to avoid the additional requirements imposed by Rule 
23(b)(3).  However, when the relief sought in the proposed Rule 
23(b)(2) class action includes monetary damages in addition to the 
injunctive relief, absent class members with a legitimate monetary 
damage claim may be bound to an adverse outcome in the class ac-
tion—an action about which the absent class member may not have 
known and from which the absent class member could not have opt-
ed out. 
B. Due Process Protection for Absent Class Members 
Class actions are an exception to the general rule that an in per-
sonam judgment is not binding on a person when he was not desig-
nated as a party or was not served with process.40  In contrast to the 
general rule, a class action is binding on the absent parties, even 
when the absent parties were unaware of the action.41  For this reason, 
Rule 23 strictly imposes conditions on when a class may be certified.  
Courts must rigorously assess whether Rule 23’s requirements are met 
to ensure that the due process rights of absent class members are pro-
tected.42 
In the academic discourse, there is consensus that due process re-
quires adequate representation at minimum.43  Indeed, this is re-
 
 40 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). 
 41 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).  See generally Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won:  The Fu-
ture Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 35–36 (2011) 
(“The [absent] class members are bound by a court judgment they may not have known 
about, much less consented to.  This extraordinary situation is justified by the class’s ho-
mogeneity and cohesiveness.”); Weber, supra note 37, at 348 (“Together the [binding 
judgment and notice] provisions cause individuals to be bound by res judicata by cases 
they never knew existed.  This situation seems patently unfair.”). 
 42 See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982) (emphasizing the importance of 
adhering to the prerequisites of Rule 23 in Title VII class actions). 
 43 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away:  Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class 
Actions, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1079, 1089–90 (2009) (observing that the Supreme Court 
“equated adequate representation with due process as a prerequisite to a binding class 
judgment” in Hansberry and that it insisted on adequate representation in Amchem and 
Ortiz as well (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. 
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940))); Stephen J. Saf-
ranek, Do Class Action Plaintiffs Lose Their Constitutional Rights?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 263, 282–
83 (1996) (observing that in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the Third Circuit found 
that “adequacy of representation, not opt out rights or personal jurisdiction, was the 
touchstone of due process” (citing Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 
1975))).  For an argument that the Supreme Court’s doctrine has been paternalistic in 
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quired by Rule 23.44  Adequate representation encompasses two parts:  
(1) adequate representation by the named plaintiffs in the class ac-
tion; and (2) adequate representation by the class counsel.45  With re-
gard to the first, the interests of the representative plaintiffs must be 
aligned with those of the absent class members, meaning that there 
should not be conflicts of interest within the class and that there 
should be uniformity within the class.46  With regard to the second, 
there is a distinction drawn between individual and aggregate litiga-
tion contexts.  In the individual context, the plaintiff assumes the risk 
of poor decisions regarding his representation or litigation strategy.47  
In contrast, with aggregate litigation such as a class action, there is 
concern about having the absent class members assume all of this 
risk.  This concern is illustrated by the requirement in Rule 23 that 
class counsel “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
class.”48 
There is a distinction between the due process concerns raised by 
actions seeking monetary relief and those seeking purely injunctive 
relief.  Generally, monetary damages are backward-looking in nature.  
Monetary damages are sought to address wrongs that have already 
happened and to compensate the individuals who were injured.  
 
focusing solely on the adequacy of representation, see generally Redish & Larsen, supra 
note 28, at 1616 (“Although both Rule 23 and Supreme Court doctrine seek to protect 
the due process rights of absent class members, at no point [has anyone] recognized that 
what has been implemented is purely a paternalistic form of due process—i.e., the concern 
that those who represent the interests of the absent litigants enforce and protect those lit-
igants’ rights enthusiastically and in good faith.”). 
 44 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 45 Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4). 
 46 Professor Wolff describes the often-overlooked problems with adequacy of representation 
posed by class actions for the purposes of preclusion doctrine, which is nevertheless ap-
plicable to this discussion as well.  Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Liti-
gation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 723 (2005) [hereinafter Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action 
Litigation] (“Foremost among these [problems] are potential conflicts of interest.  When 
members of an otherwise cohesive class possess different configurations of factually relat-
ed claims beyond those presented for class certification, the threat of claim and issue pre-
clusion can give them starkly different incentives to prosecute or settle the action.  Still 
other preclusion problems can affect the entire class uniformly.  Strategic litigation 
choices—like a decision to eschew a federal cause of action in order to stay in state court, 
or a failure to request a particular form of injunctive relief when seeking institutional re-
form—raise questions about the limits of the representational role in a class proceed-
ing.”). 
 47 See id. at 721 (“Just as an individual litigant in a civil proceeding does not enjoy any right 
of adequate representation that could enable him to escape the effects of a judgment, 
and hence assumes the risk that his lawyers will make bad litigation choices on his behalf, 
so a litigant assumes the risk that the judgment that results from a lawsuit may compro-
mise other important interests that he possesses.”). 
 48 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4). 
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Consequently, monetary damages are more focused on individual re-
lief49 than an injunction, and theoretically are specifically attributable 
to individuals rather than a collective group.  As a result, there is a 
sense that each individual class member has a right to a monetary 
remedy for this injury.  Due process is necessary to protect these indi-
vidual rights to a monetary remedy. 
In contrast, injunctions are forward-looking.  They seek to prevent 
injury that an actor, for example the defendant, is currently inflict-
ing, such as discriminating on the basis of sex.  In this way, an injunc-
tion is essentially about preventing a collective harm.  Injunctive re-
lief, therefore, seeks to prevent the defendant from harming 
members of the class in the future.  Because of this, it is more difficult 
to argue that absent class members’ due process rights are not suffi-
ciently protected in a Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking only injunctive re-
lief.50 
C. Concerns About the Adequacy of Due Process Protection for Absent Class 
Members 
There is disagreement in the academic discourse about which due 
process protections provided to absent class members in Rule 
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes are sufficient.  Some argue for a sliding 
scale51 or balancing test approach52 to determine what due process 
protection is required in a particular instance.  Others argue that due 
process may require an opt-in, rather than an opt-out, mechanism.53  
 
 49 See infra note 225 (discussing the distinct issues raised by punitive damages).  
 50 However, there are arguments that this deprives absent class members of an important 
right, the right of individual litigant autonomy.  See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, 
WHOLESALE JUSTICE:  CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS 
ACTION LAWSUIT 135–75 (2009). 
 51 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide 
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2076 (2008) (arguing that “Shutts requires a degree 
of procedural due process in class proceedings that varies with the extent to which a 
court proposes to place class members at risk of an alteration in their legal position” (cit-
ing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985))). 
 52 See Steven T.O. Cottreau, Note, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 480, 482, 510 (1998) (arguing that “two separate due process arguments support 
the right to opt out:  one related to adjudicatory jurisdiction and the other dealing with 
basic procedural fairness,” and advocating the use of a balancing test “[t]o determine 
whether due process requires opt out rights as a matter of procedural fairness”). 
 53 See Bassett, supra note 43, at 1115–16, 1118 (concluding that “the due process protections 
accorded to unnamed class members are limited, and their attenuated nature creates a 
striking contrast to the more vigilant protections provided in nonclass litigation” and rec-
ommending using an opt-in mechanism rather than an opt-out mechanism to address 
this problem); Safranek, supra note 43, at 266 (arguing “that absent a unitary class inter-
est, the Constitution arguably requires the use of an ‘opt in’ procedure to establish the 
!
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Finally, one scholar argues that individuals have a right to individual 
litigant autonomy, meaning both a right to fully control the litigation 
and to decide whether to turn to litigation at all.54  Class actions, by 
definition, strip absent class members of this right to individual liti-
gant autonomy. 
Looking back at the history of Rule 23’s amendments, the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee, which drafted Rule 23, did not seem par-
ticularly concerned about the due process rights of absent class 
members in the mandatory classes, Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) clas-
ses.55  While unusual at first glance, this makes sense with what ap-
pears to be the Committee’s underlying assumption:  the courts are 
capable of determining the extent of due process required for absent 
class members on a case-by-case basis.56  The Supreme Court’s deci-
sions on the issue of what due process requires indicate the Court’s 
own lack of certainty as to what the Due Process Clause requires for 
absent class members in the mandatory classes.57 
1. Rule 23 Amendment History 
In 1966, the class action rules were significantly revised.58  While 
there were substantial revisions to Rule 23 after the 1966 amend-
ments, none of them significantly affected the Rule’s treatment of 
Rule 23(b)(2) classes.59  The 1966 Rule Amendment Committee 
 
plaintiff class” and that “[s]uch a requirement would clearly satisfy due process” and “en-
sure the liberty of those who do not want to be part of a lawsuit”). 
 54 See generally REDISH, supra note 50, at 135–75.  In addition, others have argued that there 
is a “right of access to the courts,” which is often specifically guaranteed in state constitu-
tions.  See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers:  A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 89 (2011) (noting that such 
rights can be found, implicitly or explicitly, in forty state constitutions). 
 55 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 56 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 57 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 58 This was one of the biggest amendments to Rule 23 and these amendments set up the 
current framework that still exists in Rule 23 today. 
 59 While the 2003 amendments did not substantially alter the Rule’s treatment of Rule 
23(b)(2) classes, the 2003 Amendments did have an effect on Rule 23(b)(2) classes.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee’s notes (2003) (discussing revision of Rule 
23(c)(2) and calling attention “to the court’s authority—already established in part by 
Rule 23(d)(2)—to direct notice of certification of a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class” and 
making changes to the Rule’s notice provisions, settlement provisions, class counsel pro-
visions, and attorney fee provisions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee’s notes 
(2003) (noting Rule 23(e)’s amendment of class action settlement procedure for classes 
certified under any of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b)).  The 1998 Rule 23 amendments 
significantly altered Rule 23, but did not change the Rule’s treatment of Rule 23(b)(2) 
class actions.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1998) (amending rule 23 
!
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notes and reports suggest that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 
was not terribly concerned about the due process rights of absent 
class members in Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes.  The Commit-
tee Note to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 does not mention due 
process anywhere within the description of subdivision 23(b).60  It is 
only raised once—in the discussion of subdivision 23(d).61 
In the Report to the Standing Committee, the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee is almost cursory in its discussion of Rule 23(b)(2) and 
focuses much more extensively on the details of and requirements for 
Rule 23(b)(3) classes.62  The discussion of due process is similarly lim-
ited in the Committee’s Report.63  Even the acknowledged purpose of 
the Rule 23 amendments is not particularly motivated by due process 
concerns.64 
A contemporaneous article written by Professor Kaplan, the Re-
porter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules at the time the 1966 
amendments were drafted, captures the intentions of the Civil Rules 
 
to provide for permissive interlocutory review of class certification orders).  The 1987, 
2007, and 2009 amendments to Rule 23 did not significantly alter Rule 23.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1987) (making technical amendments); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (2007) (updating as part of the general restyling of 
the Federal Rules); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (2009) (revising rules 
with ten-day time periods to fourteen-day time periods).  For an additional discussion of 
the Rule 23 amendment history, see Mark A. Perry & Rachel S. Brass, Rule 23(b)(2) Certifi-
cation of Employment Class Actions:  A Return to First Principles, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
681, 688–89 (2010) (discussing Rule 23 amendment history).  Perry and Brass represent-
ed Wal-Mart in Dukes.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (2011) 
(listing attorneys for each party). 
 60 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) advisory committee’s notes (1966). 
 61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes (1966). 
 62 There is only one paragraph dedicated to discussing Rule 23(b)(2), whereas the discus-
sion of Rule 23(b)(3) is nearly five pages.  See Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Comm. 
on Civil Rules to the Standing Comm. on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the U.S., at 5 (June 10, 1965), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rul
esAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV06-1965.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee State-
ment]. 
 63 There is only a single mention of due process in the Advisory Committee Statement.  See 
Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 62, at 9 (stating “in the end constitutional 
standards of due process must be complied with or the member will not be bound by the 
judgment”); see also Weber, supra note 37, at 371 (observing that the Rule 23 framers 
“could not anticipate the role that the Rule would play” in “the explosion in civil rights 
and antipoverty litigation . . . in the late 1960’s,” and consequently, “[t]he Advisory 
Committee Note and Benjamin Kaplan’s 1967 article explaining the Advisory Commit-
tee’s intentions in the 1966 revisions treat subdivision (b)(2) almost as an afterthought”) 
(citing Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:  1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 389 (1967)). 
 64 The Advisory Committee Statement notes that the 1966 revisions responded to “an in-
sistent demand and need . . . to develop improved methods of handling disputes affecting 
groups” going forward.  See Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 62, at 7. 
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Advisory Committee in the 1966 amendments of Rule 23 (or at least 
one view of the Committee’s intentions).65  Professor Kaplan notes 
that the earlier equity rules upon which Rule 23 is based paid little 
attention to the details of procedural management of class actions 
and the possibility of due process requirements for absent class 
members.66  In revising the class action rules, the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee was particularly concerned with distinguishing between 
what were seen as “natural” class actions and those actions for which 
class resolution served efficiency goals instead of deriving naturally 
from the type of claim.67  Rule 23(b)(2) was built largely on experi-
ence “in the civil rights field,” though not exclusively so.68 
Rule 23(b)(3) was the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s attempt 
to deal with situations that did not fit in the “natural” class action 
arena, yet would be well-served by “advantages of economy of effort 
and uniformity of result without undue dilution of procedural safe-
guards for members of the class or for the opposing party.”69  Because 
these Rule 23(b)(3) class actions did not have a clear precursor in the 
old class action rules, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee spent con-
siderable time setting out procedural safeguards,70 along with other 
requirements to help courts manage the class action and ensure that 
a class action was “‘superior’ to other means of disposing of the par-
ticular set of quarrels.”71  These procedural safeguards demonstrate 
some concern with the due process rights of both plaintiffs and de-
fendants.  The Civil Rules Advisory Committee also addressed the 
possibility of an opt-in provision for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, instead of 
the opt-out provision, but concluded that it would not be fair to the 
defendant.72 
 
 65 Kaplan, supra note 63, at 379 (recapturing the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s discus-
sions during the 1966 amendments to Rule 23). 
 66 Id. (“Management questions, including notably the general question of the desirability of 
providing some notice or information to class members, came to the fore in the profes-
sional appraisals of Hansberry v. Lee, decided in 1940.” (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 
32 (1940))). 
 67 See Kaplan, supra note 63, at 386–87. 
 68 See id. at 389. 
 69 Id. at 390. 
 70 See id. at 390–92. 
 71 Id. at 390. 
 72 See id. at 397 (discussing the argument that “[i]t is unfair to a defendant opposing the 
class . . . to subject him to possible liability toward individuals who remain passive after re-
ceiving notice”).  While counter-intuitive, the defendant would not prefer an opt-in pro-
cedure because one of the appealing aspects of a class action is that all potential related 
claims can be resolved in a single action.  With an opt-in procedure, the defendant risks 
being sued later by those former class members that chose not to opt in.  Because class 
members were required to opt in, the defendant does not have an exhaustive list of all 
!
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The revised Rule 23 included a general provision listing discre-
tionary steps that a court could take to better manage class actions of 
all types, including a provision stating “that notice be given to some 
or all members of the class informing them of any event in the action, 
or of their opportunity to speak their piece on the adequacy of the 
representation, or to intervene in the action.”73  In discussing criti-
cism of this discretionary notice, Professor Kaplan notes that 
“[n]otice which is fair in the circumstances of the case is a constitu-
tional requirement,” and it is reasonable to “expect courts to work 
toward providing the best practicable notice, as indeed 
(c)(2) . . . requires.”74  This explanation lends support to the idea that 
there is a constitutional right to notice in some class action circum-
stances, and that this right exists outside of the requirements of Rule 
23. 
Presumably the Civil Rules Advisory Committee felt that courts 
were well equipped to determine the extent of notice required by the 
Due Process Clause.  Professor Kaplan’s observation about constitu-
tional notice implies that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee did not 
think that the same type of notice was required for every possible type 
of class and set of facts.  His article suggests that the lack of attention 
to due process with regard to Rule 23(b)(2) classes was not because 
due process was not a concern of the Committee.  Instead, because 
the Constitution already contained a guarantee of due process, there 
was no need to mandate all the circumstances under which constitu-
tional due process might require more for a Rule 23(b)(2) class ac-
tion.  Thus, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee arguably felt that 
courts had the competence to determine the extent of protection re-
quired for absent class members by the Due Process Clause on a case-
by-case basis. 
2. Judicial Interpretation of Due Process Requirements in Mandatory 
Classes 
Prior to the 1966 Rule 23 amendments, the Supreme Court first 
recognized the need to consider the due process rights of absent class 
 
this potential plaintiffs.  With the opt-out provision, in contrast, the defendant can fully 
resolve all the claims in a single action, except those of the class members choosing to opt 
out.  But unlike the opt-in scenario, the defendant has an exhaustive list of those plain-
tiffs, and could potentially reach out proactively to resolve, if the defendant wished. 
 73 Id. at 394 (describing discretionary steps laid out within the revised Rule 23(d)(2)). 
 74 Id. at 396 (referencing Rule 23(c)(2)). 
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members in 1940, in Hansberry v. Lee.75  In Hansberry, the Supreme 
Court held that there was a “failure of due process” only when the 
procedure adopted did not “fairly insure[] the protection of the in-
terests of absent parties who [were] to be bound by it.”76  A decade 
later, the Supreme Court provided additional guidance in Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., holding that due process required 
notice “reasonably calculated to reach interested parties.”77  Following 
Mullane, only two Supreme Court class action decisions provide addi-
tional guidance on the due process requirements for classes certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2).78 
Nearly a half-century after Hansberry, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts changed how courts viewed due 
process in the context of class actions.79  Shutts involved a class action 
seeking monetary relief, brought by investors in a gas company.80  The 
class was certified under Kansas state law, instead of one of the Rule 
23(b) classes.81  Each member of the nationwide class was provided 
notice via mail, which explained the right to opt out of the litiga-
tion.82  The Kansas court’s jurisdiction over the absent, out-of-state 
class members was challenged.83  The Supreme Court rejected the ar-
gument that due process required absent class members to affirma-
 
 75 311 U.S. 32 (1940).  This decision is cited in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 
Rule 23 Amendments.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes (1966) (cit-
ing Hansberry in support of the proposition that “mandatory notice pursuant to subdivi-
sion (c)(2), together with any discretionary notice which the court may find it advisable 
to give under subdivision (d)(2), is designed to fulfill requirements of due process”). 
 76 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42.  Hansberry laid open “[t]he task of specifying the requirements 
of ‘adequacy’ that conform to due process” and that task has not yet been fully resolved.  
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et. al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1849, 1948 (1998).  For an argument that “Hansberry supports the proposition 
that the failure to provide adequate representation violates due process if the adjudica-
tion binds an absent class member,” see Weber, supra note 37, at 384. 
 77 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950). 
 78 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (considering whether due pro-
cess requires absent class members to opt in to an action affirmatively); Ortiz v. Fibre-
board Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (deciding whether due process requires opt-out rights 
for absent class members in a 23(b)(1) action). 
 79 See Daniels, supra note 31, at 510 (arguing that, “[i]n the context of class actions, Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts substantially reconfigured the way in which courts view due process 
rights”). 
 80 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799. 
 81 Id. at 801. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See id. at 806 (“Reduced to its essentials, petitioner’s argument is that unless out-of-state 
plaintiffs affirmatively consent, the Kansas courts may not exert jurisdiction over their 
claims.”). 
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tively opt in to the litigation.84  Holding that due process required “at 
a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity 
to remove himself from the class” when monetary claims were in-
volved, the Supreme Court affirmed the notice procedure and the 
Kansas court’s jurisdiction over the absent, out-of-state class mem-
bers.85  However, the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question 
of what the Due Process Clause required when only equitable relief 
was sought.86 
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court addressed the con-
ditions for certification under the other mandatory class, Rule 
23(b)(1).87  Specifically, the Court addressed the certification of “a 
mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory” under 
23(b)(1)(B).88  A limited fund is where the money that is available 
(i.e. the fund) is inadequate to compensate fully all the class mem-
bers.89  Ortiz involved an asbestos class action settlement, with substan-
tial monetary damages.90  Because of the monetary damages, the Su-
preme Court focused on the need for opt-out rights for the absent 
class members.91  Drawing similarities to the situation in Shutts, the 
Supreme Court explained that both cases involved extinguishing an 
absent class member’s monetary claim and that minimum due pro-
 
 84 See id. at 812 (“We reject petitioner’s contention that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that absent plaintiffs affirmatively ‘opt in’ to the class, rather 
than be deemed members of the class if they do not ‘opt out.’”). 
 85 Id. at 811–12. 
 86 See id. at 811 n.3 (“Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek to bind 
known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments.  We 
intimate no view concerning other types of class actions, such as those seeking equitable 
relief. Nor, of course, does our discussion of personal jurisdiction address class actions 
where the jurisdiction is asserted against a defendant class.” (emphasis omitted)); see also 
Safranek, supra note 43, at 264 (observing that the Shutts “Court did not explain why the 
Constitution required such an option solely in money damage cases” and noting that the 
Shutts Court did not provide guidance on when a class action “was wholly or predominate-
ly for money judgments” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 87 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). 
 88 Id. 
 89 An example is in bankruptcy when the claims of creditors exceed the amount available.  
By aggregating the claims together, the total amount available can be equitably distribut-
ed to all the creditors, instead of creating a race to the courthouse, which would poten-
tially leave some creditors empty-handed. 
 90 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 824–25 (describing a negotiated “Global Settlement Agreement” valued 
at $1.535 billion and a backup “Trilateral Settlement Agreement” that would provide $2 
billion in the event that the Global Settlement agreement failed to win approval). 
 91 See id. at 846–48 (noting that “[t]he inherent tension between representative suits and the 
day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied to damages claims gathered in a mandatory 
class”); see also Daniels, supra note 31, at 511 (observing that “minimum procedural due 
process includes, among other things, the opportunity to opt out” (footnote omitted)). 
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cess required that an absent class member be given the opportunity 
to remove himself from the litigation.92  Finding that the settlement 
class did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the Su-
preme Court invalidated the settlement class.93 
In particular, the Supreme Court was concerned because the case 
did not involve a true limited fund;94 instead, “the fund was lim-
ited . . . by the agreement of the parties,” which the Supreme Court 
found to be at odds with the concept of limited funds embodied in 
Rule 23(b)(1).95  The Supreme Court’s discomfort with mandatory 
classes involving monetary damages is evidenced in the Court’s lan-
guage:  “[t]he inherent tension between representative suits and the 
day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied to damages claims gath-
ered in a mandatory class.”96  Some, or much, of the discomfort was 
likely due to the Supreme Court’s finding that the case did not in-
volve a true limited fund, not just the inclusion of monetary damages 
in a mandatory class.97  It is not clear whether the Supreme Court 
would have had the same due process concerns had the case involved 
a true limited fund. 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively on the permissibil-
ity of monetary damages in Rule 23(b)(2) actions.98  To date, the Su-
preme Court has not provided clarification on the question of “when 
absent class members have a constitutional right to [choose to] opt 
out of [a] class action[] . . . assert[ing] monetary damages on their 
behalf.”99  Twice the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue, 
but in both cases, it dismissed the case as improvidently granted.100 
 
 92 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 848 (observing that “before an absent class member’s right of action 
was extinguishable due process required that the member ‘receive notice plus an oppor-
tunity to be heard and participate in the litigation,’ and we said that ‘at a minimum . . . an 
absent plaintiff [must] be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the 
class’” (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 
(1985)). 
 93 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864–65. 
 94 See id. at 841 (describing a true limited fund as one “justified with reference to a ‘fund’ 
with a definitely ascertained limit, all of which would be distributed to satisfy all those 
with liquidated claims based on a common theory of liability, by an equitable, pro rata 
distribution”). 
 95 Id. at 848. 
 96 Id. at 846 (emphasis added). 
 97 See id. at 846–47. 
 98 See Daniels, supra note 31, at 511 (observing that, following Ortiz, “it is . . . unclear wheth-
er opt-out rights are required in all cases where monetary damages are involved or 
whether they are necessary only in cases where such damages ‘predominate’”). 
 99 Id. at 500. 
100 See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83 (1997) (dismissing the writ as improvidently granted, 
but noting that the Court remained interested in considering the issue of monetary dam-
!
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In the first of these cases that the Supreme Court dismissed as im-
providently granted, Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, the Court dis-
missed the writ because it would have required resolution of “a con-
stitutional question that may [have been] entirely hypothetical.”101  In 
the Court’s subsequent discussion, the Court observed that there was 
“at least a substantial possibility” that “in actions seeking monetary 
damages, classes [could] be certified only under Rule 
23(b)(3) . . . and not under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).”102  The Court 
presented this “substantial possibility” as a reason for avoiding the 
due process issue.  Three years later, the Supreme Court again grant-
ed certiorari on the issue, but again dismissed the case as improvi-
dently granted, in Adams v. Robertson.103  In Adams, the Supreme Court 
simply noted its “continuing interest” in this issue before it dismissed 
the case.104  As a result of the Supreme Court leaving the issue unre-
solved, Circuit Courts have taken different approaches to analyzing 
whether monetary relief sought by class members can be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2).105 
D. Further Complications Raised by Preclusion Doctrine 
Moreover, whether the due process protections afforded absent 
class members are sufficient depends to some degree on the preclu-
sive effect given to the class judgments in subsequent litigation.  Gen-
erally, preclusion doctrine operates to prevent parties from re-
litigating the same issue or multiplying litigation by litigating differ-
ent aspects of the same claim in subsequent litigation.106  Adequate 
representation is a prerequisite for the application of issue and claim 
preclusion to judgments in a class action.107 
 
ages in a Rule 23(b)(2) action); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (de-
clining to decide the question of whether monetary damages are permissible in Rule 
23(b)(2) actions). 
101 Ticor, 511 U.S. at 118. 
102 Id. at 121. 
103 Adams, 520 U.S. at 85. 
104 Id. at 92 n.6. 
105 See Julian W. Poon & Blaine H. Evanson, Class Distinctions, L.A. LAWYER, Feb. 2011, at 18–
20.  See also infra Part II.B (discussing the approaches taken by the circuits and the impact 
of Dukes on the continued viability of the various circuit tests). 
106 See infra Part I.D.1. 
107 See infra Part I.D.2. 
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1. Background on Preclusion 
There are two types of preclusion:  issue preclusion and claim 
preclusion.108  Issue preclusion bars parties from re-litigating an issue 
if the parties previously litigated the issue involved and the issue was 
determined and necessary to the judgment.109  Claim preclusion bars 
parties from raising any claim that was brought or should have been 
brought in prior litigation when that litigation resulted in a judgment 
on the merits.110  Due process, as a general rule, prevents both preclu-
sion doctrines from applying to those who were not parties in the 
original litigation.111 
There are limited exceptions to this general rule that only parties 
may be bound by preclusion doctrine; one exception is for Rule 23 
class actions.112  The nonparty absent class members are bound by the 
class action judgment, even though they were not parties in the orig-
inal action in the traditional sense.113  Until recently, the literature has 
overlooked the implications of giving class action decisions preclusive 
 
108 There are four sources of the rules governing inter-jurisdictional preclusion:  (1) the Full 
Faith and Credit Statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (stating that all “Acts, records and 
judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 
United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which 
they are taken”); (2) the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full 
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Pro-
ceedings of every other State.”); (3) the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 
(stating that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”); and (4) Arti-
cle III of the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (stating that 
the “judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution” and listing other areas to which the federal judicial power extends). 
109 See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.01 (3d ed. 1997).  The 
discussion of preclusion doctrine is significantly streamlined for the purposes of this 
Comment. 
110 See id. at § 131.01 (citing the classic formulation from Cromwell v. Cnty of Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 
352 (1876)). 
111 See MOORE, supra note 109, at §§ 131.40, 132.04.  See also Bassett, supra note 43, at 1097 
(observing that courts are generally “cognizant that the preclusion doctrines may only be 
applied under circumstances that comport with constitutional due process”). 
112 See Bassett, supra note 43, at 1110 (noting that class actions are “the most attenuated of all 
the nonparty exceptions” and are “distinctive even within the representative suit excep-
tion”). 
113 See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 43, at 1079 (noting that class members do not enjoy direct 
representation in litigation). 
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effect when absent class members seek to raise issues or claims similar 
to those litigated in the class action.114 
The purpose of the preclusion doctrines is to “relieve parties of 
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, 
and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on ad-
judication.”115  These practical concerns are present in the class action 
context as well, but class actions also raise concerns about the ability 
of absent class members to choose to participate in litigation.  In Rule 
23(b)(3) classes, parties are given the opportunity to opt out of the 
litigation,116 and thus, absent class members in 23(b)(3) classes have 
an opportunity to make a choice about whether to remain in the 
class.  Presumably those who wanted to try to get a better result on 
their own chose to opt out of the class. 
In contrast, the fact that Rule 23 does not require notice and opt-
out rights for class members in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action117 raises a 
potential problem when preclusion doctrine is applied to bar absent 
class members from litigating the same issues or a related claim.  Sim-
ilar justifications support the use of preclusion for Rule 23(b)(2) 
judgments when applied in a later action seeking the same sort of re-
lief, i.e., injunctive relief, as support the lack of additional require-
ments in certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class, namely the indivisible na-
ture of the remedy.118  Given the indivisible nature of injunctive relief 
 
114 For a detailed examination of preclusion in the context of class actions and a framework 
for “allow[ing] courts to reclaim their proper role in constraining the preclusive effects of 
the class proceedings that they shepherd to judgment,” see generally Wolff, Preclusion in 
Class Action Litigation, supra note 46, at 717. 
115 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
116 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (describing the requirement that notice, in Rule 
23(b)(3) classes, must state “that the court will exclude from the class any member who 
requests exclusion”). 
117 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (specifying, as the only notice requirement in Rule 
23(b)(2) classes, that “the court may direct appropriate notice to the class”). 
118 See AM. LAW INST., supra note 26, at § 2.04 cmt. a (2010).  Section 2.04 defines indivisible 
remedies as “those such that the distribution of relief to any claimant as a practical matter 
determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants.”  Id. at 
§ 2.04(b).  Section 2.04 continues by noting that: 
court[s] may authorize aggregate treatment of common issues concerning an in-
divisible remedy by way of a class action, with no requirement . . . that claim-
ants . . . be afforded an opportunity to exclude themselves . . . .  Aggregate treat-
ment as to an indivisible remedy may be appropriate even though additional 
divisible remedies are also available that warrant individual treatment . . . .   
  Id. at § 2.04(c).  Section 2.04 explains that “considerations of due process generally re-
quire that the court determine the distribution of divisible remedies on an aggregate ba-
sis only upon affording claimants an opportunity to escape the preclusive effect of that 
determination.”  Id. at § 2.04(c) cmt. a.  However, claim preclusion operates differently; 
there is an exception to the general rule against claim splitting, when the court in the 
original action “expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action . . . .”  
!
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usually sought in Rule 23(b)(2) classes, it is neither feasible nor logi-
cal for parties to opt out of the class to get a better, or different, in-
junction on their own.119 
In addition, preclusion gives defendants incentives to settle the 
class action to conclusively determine and extinguish their liability in 
a single action.120  Class actions, “[a]s a procedural device, . . . would 
likely suffer an immediate decline in utility if a class judgment carried 
only precedential value without preclusive effect.”121  The application 
of preclusion doctrines to class actions, thus, makes it more attractive 
for defendants to resolve the class claims.  This, in turn, helps both 
the representative plaintiffs and the absent class members get relief 
and resolution. 
2. Due Process, Preclusion Doctrine, and Collateral Attacks 
Traditionally, the view has been that adequate representation is a 
necessary precursor to the application of preclusion against absent 
class members.122  This traditional approach dates back to Hansberry v. 
Lee, in 1940.123  In the last decade, there has been a growing debate 
over “whether an absent class member may attack a class judgment 
for inadequate representation in subsequent litigation.”124 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW:  JUDGMENTS 2d § 26(1)(b) (1982).  There is at least 
a possibility here that when a court certifies a Rule 23(b)(2) class that excludes damages 
relief, a subsequent court could interpret that as an express reservation of the plaintiff’s 
right to maintain a later action for damages relief.  I am indebted to Professor Struve for 
this suggestion. 
119 For an example involving alleged pattern-or-practice employment discrimination, see AM. 
LAW INST., supra note 26, § 2.04 illus. 5.  While employees’ claims for backpay are divisible 
remedies, “the court should consider whether aggregate treatment of any common issues 
concerning Defendant’s liability will determine, in practical effect, the availability and 
method for the distribution of backpay.”  Id.  If it does, then the court may treat the 
claims for backpay on an aggregate basis.  Id. 
120 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 37, at 375 (observing that “[t]he value of suits such as Mullane 
lies in their preclusion, by res judicata, of all potential claims over the accounts”). 
121 See Bassett, supra note 43, at 1116. 
122 See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4455, at 485 
(2d ed. 2002) (“It has long been the general understanding that only adequate represen-
tation can justify preclusion against nonparticipating class members.”); see also Bassett, su-
pra note 43, at 1099 (observing that the preclusion analysis is set within an adequate rep-
resentation framework); Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, supra note 46, at 742 
(observing that preclusion is often thought about under the “rubric of adequacy of repre-
sentation”). 
123 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1940) (allowing absent class members to collat-
erally attack the class judgment on the ground that they were inadequately represented). 
124 Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation in Class Suits for 
Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 917, 917 (2010). 
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Starting with an influential article criticizing the long-held view,125 
there has been a push by critics of the traditional view to narrow the 
“traditional availability of collateral attack for inadequate representa-
tion.”126  A collateral attack allows a party to challenge the enforce-
ment of a prior judgment.127  Thus, an absent class member is able to 
challenge the class action judgment on the grounds that there was 
inadequate representation.  One scholar, Professor Woolley, argues 
that this narrowing is “inconsistent with the proper interpretation of 
class action rules and the Constitution.”128  Professor Woolley explains 
that “[t]he foundation of the traditional approach to adequate repre-
sentation rests on the recognition that the ‘interest’ protected by the 
adequate representation requirement is the constitutionally-
protected property interest of an individual class member in his or 
her claim.”129 
Both preclusion doctrine and Rule 23 depend on the adequacy of 
representation.  This raises some troubling issues when considering 
the inclusion of monetary damages in Rule 23(b)(2) actions.  The ab-
sent class members in these suits may not know about the litigation, 
yet not only are they bound by it, but they also have limited oppor-
tunity to challenge the adequacy of the representation in the original 
class proceeding.130  Preclusion doctrine, and the potentially limited 
availability of a collateral attack for inadequate representation, exac-
erbate the due process concerns raised in Rule 23(b)(2) classes.  Ad-
ditionally, these due process concerns may become more pressing, 
depending on how the debate over the availability of collateral at-
tacks for inadequate representation plays out. 
II.  EFFECT OF WAL-MART V. DUKES ON EXISTING JUDICIAL STANDARDS 
FOR MONETARY DAMAGES IN RULE 23(B)(2) CLASSES 
Prior to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the existing case law regard-
ing when claims for monetary damages could be certified along with 
 
125 Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions:  A 
Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998) (proposing that, instead of 
the traditional approach that there must have been adequate representation in order to 
apply preclusion against absent class members, incentives should be provided to all par-
ties to participate in the original action, coupled with a narrower, process-based standard 
for collateral attack). 
126 Woolley, supra note 124, at 919. 
127 See MOORE, supra note 109, at § 130.06. 
128 Woolley, supra note 124, at 920. 
129 Id. at 921. 
130 Additionally, if the narrowing of the availability of collateral attacks described by Profes-
sor Woolley continues, it will be even more difficult to collaterally attack. 
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claims for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) had resulted in a cir-
cuit split.  The Supreme Court had previously observed in dicta that 
there was a “substantial possibility” that claims for monetary damages 
could “be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3),” but had declined to 
fully resolve the question.131  The Supreme Court’s discussion in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes of monetary remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) clas-
ses emphasizes the history of Rule 23 and the Rule’s structure.  Dukes 
significantly limits the standards that had been used by lower courts 
in assessing when Rule 23(b)(2) classes involving monetary damages 
could be certified.  A close reading of the Supreme Court’s decision 
suggests that the Court’s limitation on monetary remedies in Rule 
23(b)(2) can be understood as having been motivated by due process 
concerns.  In addition, the lack of an outright prohibition on claims 
for monetary relief in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions is consistent with 
the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s implied understanding of 
a court’s ability to determine the due process required for Rule 
23(b)(2) classes on a case-by-case basis. 
A. Wal-Mart v. Dukes Leaves Open the Question of the Permissibility of 
Monetary Damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) Class 
Given the lack of clarity surrounding the question of when, if at 
all, monetary damages could be included in a Rule 23(b)(2) class, 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes was an opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to provide clarification.  Indeed the Court granted certiorari to 
address this question.132  The Supreme Court unanimously held that 
the class in Dukes was not one that could be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2).133  However, the Court passed on the opportunity to pro-
vide guidance on whether monetary damages could ever be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2), addressing it only speculatively in dicta.134 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision explicitly left unanswered the 
question with which the circuits were struggling.  The Supreme Court 
 
131 Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994). 
132 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795, 795 (2010) (granting certiorari to ad-
dress Question 1 presented by the petition); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2010) (No. 10-277) (“Whether claims for monetary 
relief can be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)—which by its 
terms is limited to injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief—and, if so, under what 
circumstances.”). 
133 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
134 In addition, the Supreme Court held that the certification of the plaintiff class in Dukes 
was inconsistent with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).  Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552–
53.  This Comment does not discuss that portion of the decision. 
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found that plaintiffs’ damages were not incidental because they 
would require individual determination and were significant in dollar 
amount.135  Because the Court found that the monetary damages pre-
dominated over the injunctive relief sought, it chose not to address 
the question of what level of monetary damages might be allowable 
under Rule 23(b)(2).136  Instead, the Court held simply that the 
“claims for individualized relief” in Dukes did not satisfy Rule 
23(b)(2).137  The Court followed this with an observation in dicta that 
the Court was not sure if there were any forms of incidental monetary 
relief that would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of Rule 23(b)(2) and that would also comply with the Due Pro-
cess Clause.138 
1. Focus on the Historical Uses of Class Actions 
In Dukes, the Supreme Court emphasized the historical approach 
that it had taken in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. when seeking to determine 
the types of classes properly brought under each of the subdivisions 
of 23(b).139  In Ortiz, the Court was particularly concerned about the 
significant monetary damages sought and the lack of an opportunity 
for absent class members to opt out.  Additionally, the Supreme 
Court in Dukes found persuasive the illustrative examples in the Advi-
sory Committee Notes to Rule 23, which indicate that Rule 23(b)(2) 
was based on experience with the civil rights field.140  The Court ob-
served that the Advisory Committee Notes contained no examples of 
 
135 Id. at 2560–61. 
136 Id. at 2560. 
137 Id. at 2557 (concluding that “at a minimum, claims for individualized relief (like the 
backpay at issue here) [did] not satisfy the Rule,” and not reaching the broader question 
of whether incidental monetary damages would ever be consistent with Rule 23(b)(2) be-
cause “the monetary relief [was] not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
138 See id. at 2560 (“We need not decide in this case whether there are any forms of ‘inci-
dental’ monetary relief that are consistent with the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) we 
have announced and that comply with the Due Process Clause.”). 
139 See id. at 2557 (acknowledging Rule 23’s roots in equity and the Supreme Court’s focus 
on “the historical models on which the Rule was based” in Ortiz).  For a more in-depth ar-
gument from Wal-Mart’s counsel of why Ortiz’s historical analysis should be applied to an 
analysis of the classes that properly belong under 23(b)(2), see generally Perry & Brass, 
supra note 59. 
140 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (“Civil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, 
class-based discrimination are prime examples of what (b)(2) is meant to capture.”); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (“Illustrative [of Rule 23(b)(2)] 
are various actions in the civil-rights field . . . .”); Kaplan, supra note 63, at 389 (explaining 
that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were “building on experience mainly, but not ex-
clusively, in the civil rights field”). 
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predecessors to Rule 23(b)(2) involving claimants who combined in-
dividual claims for monetary relief with class-wide claims for injunc-
tive relief.141  Based on these historical models, the Court concluded 
that the key to a Rule 23(b)(2) class was the “indivisible nature of the 
injunctive or declaratory remedy.”142 
The Supreme Court observed that the discussion in the Advisory 
Committee Notes of the historical precursors to Rule 23(b)(2) does 
not include either classes seeking relief that would entitle individuals 
“to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defend-
ant” or classes seeking relief that would entitle each class member “to 
an individualized award of monetary damages.”143  The Advisory 
Committee Notes to which the Supreme Court refers do not empha-
size due process concerns in the discussion of Rule 23(b)(2), and 
their treatment of Rule 23(b)(2) relative to the Rule 23(b)(3), which 
does deal with procedural due process concerns, is quite sparse.144  
However, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee did not focus on due 
process in its discussion of Rule 23(b)(2) because of a likely underly-
ing assumption that courts were competent to determine, without 
guidance from the Rules of Civil Procedure, the extent of protection 
required by the Due Process Clause for absent class members.  The 
Supreme Court’s hesitation to unilaterally prohibit certification of 
any monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2) is consistent with the 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s underlying expectations that courts 
would determine, on a case-by-case basis, the due process rights nec-
essary for absent class members in Rule 23(b)(2) classes. 
The focus on Rule 23’s historical roots can be understood as a de-
sire to distinguish between the “natural” class actions and those al-
lowed primarily for efficiency reasons.145  The Court’s language sug-
 
141 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (“In none of the cases cited by the Advisory Committee as 
examples of (b)(2)’s antecedents did the plaintiffs combine any claim for individualized 
relief with their class-wide injunction.”). 
142 Id. at 2557.  This is consistent with the discussion of indivisible and divisible remedies in 
AM. LAW INST., supra note 26, § 2.04 (“As a general matter, ‘indivisible remedies’ are those 
handled primarily under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) . . . .”); see also discussion supra note 
118. 
143 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
144 See supra Part I.B.  
145 By “natural” class actions, I mean generally those that fit the requirements of Rules 
23(b)(1) and (b)(2), in which adjudication by one member of the class thus necessarily 
impacts the other class members.  Take, for example, the following situation.  There is a 
bus accident with 119 victims.  The bus company is insolvent, but has an insurance policy 
limit of $1.5 million.  If the first victim sues the bus company by herself, then whatever 
amount she is awarded is taken out of the $1.5 million available to all the victims.  Be-
cause this situation involves a limited fund, it falls within the category of a “natural” class 
!
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gests that it agrees with the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s sense 
that in these “natural” class actions, today’s mandatory classes, the 
Due Process Clause demands less because of the type of claim being 
brought.  This makes sense because, for example, in the sort of civil 
rights action upon which Rule 23(b)(2) was based, the idea of a sin-
gle absent class member trying to opt out of the injunction or declar-
atory judgment makes little sense and would most likely be infeasible.  
The defendant is either enjoined from continuing to use its racially 
discriminatory policies, or not.  Further, providing mandatory notice 
to all class members in the classic civil rights actions upon which Rule 
23(b)(2) is based would often be prohibitively expensive. 
2. Emphasis on Structure of Rule 23 
In addition, the Supreme Court focused intently on the structure 
of Rule 23.  Given the Rule’s structure, the Court observed that “it 
[is] clear that individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 
23(b)(3).”146  Here again, the Court relied on the Advisory Commit-
tee’s Notes, noting its observation in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 
that Rule 23(b)(3) was an “‘adventuresome innovation’” of the 1966 
Rule Amendments.147  The Court focused on the rule’s structural dif-
ferences in requirements for Rule 23(b)(3) classes as compared to 
Rule 23(b)(2) classes.  The Court emphasized that the mandatory 
classes lack the additional protections of Rule 23(b)(3), not because 
Rule 23 finds these protections unnecessary, but instead “because 
[the Rule] considers them unnecessary to a (b)(2) class.”148 
In acknowledging that notice is missing from Rule 23(b)(2)’s re-
quirements, the Court is careful to add that this is “presumably be-
cause it is thought (rightly or wrongly) that notice has no purpose 
when the class is mandatory, and that depriving people of their right 
 
action.  In contrast, take the case in which a CD manufacturer overcharged for its CDs.  
All consumers who purchased CDs in the past five years paid $0.02 more per CD than 
they should have.  Here, for efficiency reasons, it would make sense to bring a class action 
on behalf of all consumers who purchased CDs in the past five years because the amount 
per CD otherwise is too low to justify individual claims.  However, one consumer’s ability 
to get compensation from the CD manufacturer does not impact another consumer’s 
ability to do so. 
146 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558. 
147 Id. at 2558 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997)). 
148 Id. at 2558 (“The procedural protections attending the (b)(3) class—predominance, su-
periority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out—are missing from (b)(2) not be-
cause the Rule considers them unnecessary, but because it considers them unnecessary to 
a (b)(2) class.”). 
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to sue in this manner complies with the Due Process Clause.”149  The 
Court contrasts this with its prior holding in Shutts, that the “absence 
of notice and opt-out [rights] violates due process” in class actions 
predominantly for monetary relief.150  Claims for monetary damages 
play an important role in how the Court thinks about the absent class 
members’ due process rights.  Acknowledging that it had not yet ad-
dressed due process requirements in cases where classes seek mone-
tary relief that does not predominate, the Court observed that there 
is a “serious possibility” that due process would require notice and 
opt-out rights in any class seeking monetary relief.151  The Court sug-
gested this as its reason for declining to read Rule 23(b)(2) broadly.152  
But the Court stopped short of holding that due process did require 
notice and opt-out rights in any class action seeking monetary relief. 
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on the structure of Rule 23 is rem-
iniscent of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s emphasis on the 
procedural safeguards for Rule 23(b)(3) classes.  The Civil Rules Ad-
visory Committee’s procedural safeguards in Rule 23(b)(3) classes 
were motivated by due process concerns, as well as manageability 
concerns.153  Thus, the Court’s focus on the structure of Rule 23 as a 
reason to reject certification of large, individualized monetary dam-
ages under Rule 23(b)(2) is likely explained by due process concerns.  
In addition, underlying the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s lack of 
attention to due process in relation to Rule 23(b)(2) class action was 
an assumption that the courts were bound by the Due Process Clause 
to address due process concerns on a case-by-case basis for Rule 
23(b)(2) classes.  The Dukes Court’s push of this particular class to-
wards the greater protections required by Rule 23(b)(3) may have 
been its way of doing just that. 
 
 
149 Id. at 2559. 
150 Id. at 2559 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“The plain-
tiff must receive notice . . . . Additionally, we hold that due process requires . . . that an 
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by exe-
cuting and returning an ‘opt out’ . . . form to the court.”)). 
151 Dukes, 132 S. Ct. at 2559. 
152 See id. at 2559 (“[T]he serious possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason 
not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary claims here.”).  The Supreme Court’s 
desire to punt on this issue is consistent with its decisions in Ticor and Adams; both times 
the Court certified this question, but dismissed the grant of certiorari as improvidently 
granted.  See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83 (1997); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 
U.S. 117 (1994).   
153 See supra Part I.C.1.  
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3. Appropriate Standard for Determining When Monetary Damages Can 
Be Included in a Rule 23(b)(2) Class 
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed which standard to use when 
evaluating whether monetary damages might be brought under Rule 
23(b)(2), the question on which circuits were split.  When the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the certification of Dukes under Rule 23(b)(2), it had 
created a third standard, thereby adding to the existing circuit split.  
The Supreme Court’s clarification of this issue is limited. 
The Ninth Circuit had held that Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes any ac-
tion with monetary damages, so long as the monetary relief does not 
predominate.154  The Ninth Circuit’s standard relied on the definition 
of “predominate” and the Advisory Committee Note’s explanatory 
statement.155  After relying heavily on the Advisory Committee Notes 
previously, the Supreme Court was dismissive of the plaintiff’s reli-
ance on those same Notes:  “[o]f course it is the Rule itself, not the 
Advisory Committee’s description of it, that governs.”156  Certainly, 
there is a distinction between how the Supreme Court and the Ninth 
Circuit are using the Advisory Committee Notes.  However, given the 
importance the Notes play in the Court’s earlier analysis, the Court’s 
approach here is quite dismissive. 
Emphasizing its earlier arguments about the structure of Rule 23, 
the Supreme Court observed that, were it to accept the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of the Advisory Committee Notes, parties could 
avoid the protections that the Rules Committee considered critical to 
classes seeking Rule 23(b)(3) certification simply by adding “predom-
inating” injunctive relief to their monetary claims.157  The Court was 
troubled by the idea that absent class members might be denied 
 
154 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616–17 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011). 
155 See id. at 616 (“Merriam-Webster defines ‘predominant’ as ‘having superior strength, in-
fluence, or authority:  prevailing.’  To be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), therefore, a class 
must seek only monetary damages that are not ‘superior [in] strength, influence, or au-
thority’ to injunctive and declaratory relief.” (internal citation omitted) (alteration in 
original)), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s 
notes (1966) (stating that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases in which the appropri-
ate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages”). 
156 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559. 
157 See id. (“We fail to see why the Rule should be read to nullify these protections whenever a 
plaintiff class, at its option, combines its monetary claims with a request—even a “‘pre-
dominating request’—for an injunction.”). 
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compensatory damages for their valid employment discrimination 
claims if backpay were denied in this class action.158 
The Supreme Court also discussed the Fifth Circuit’s “incidental” 
damages test, which defines incidental damages as those “flow[ing] 
directly from liability to the class as a whole.”159  The Court considered 
whether the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test was consistent with its in-
terpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) and with the Due Process Clause.160  
Sidestepping a decision on this precise issue, the Supreme Court held 
that because “Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized determinations of 
each employee’s eligibility for backpay,” the “incidental” test could 
not be met.161  The Supreme Court further explained that “a class 
cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled 
to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.”162  The Supreme 
Court declined to offer a definition of “incidental.”  As a result, the 
Court’s decision may lead to a shift in the understanding of the inci-
dental test to something that considers whether the damages are in-
dividualized.163 
Thus, due process considerations run throughout the Supreme 
Court’s analysis, even if these considerations are at times below the 
surface.  Due process considerations are behind the Court’s concern 
with the potential of a plaintiff precluded from later bringing a com-
pensatory action for discrimination; likewise, due process considera-
tions are behind the Court’s concern with a defendant not able to lit-
igate its statutory defense.  Despite granting certiorari to resolve the 
circuit split on when monetary damages can be included under Rule 
23(b)(2), the Court did only a mediocre job of providing guidance 
on the issue.  However, the Court’s decision can be harmonized with 
the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s implied view of due pro-
cess for mandatory classes.  The Committee presumably felt that 
courts had the competence to determine the extent of protection re-
 
158 See id. (“That possibility underscores the need for plaintiffs with individual monetary 
claims to decide for themselves whether to tie their fates to the class representatives’ or go it 
alone—a choice Rule 23(b)(2) does not ensure that they have.”). 
159 Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998); see also infra Part 
II.B.2. 
160 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2560 (“We need not decide in this case whether there are any 
forms of ‘incidental’ monetary relief that are consistent with the interpretation of Rule 
23(b)(2) we have announced and that comply with the Due Process Clause.”). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 2561. 
163 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “You Just Can’t Get There From Here”:  A Primer on Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
80 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 93 (July 19, 2011) (“But after Wal-Mart, that ‘incidental’ standard may 
not survive and the focus may shift to whether the damages are ‘individualized’ or uni-
form.”). 
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quired by the Due Process Clause on a case-by-case basis.  While the 
Court could have held that the monetary relief in Dukes was not suit-
able for certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because all claims for 
monetary relief were inconsistent with Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, it 
did not.  Instead, the Court held that the monetary relief in Dukes was 
inappropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) because it required individual de-
termination and was significant.  The Court’s hesitation to state a 
blanket rule regarding whether monetary relief was appropriate for 
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is consistent with addressing due 
process on a more case-by-case basis. 
B. Impact on Lower Courts’ Interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2)’s Requirements 
Prior to Dukes, circuits had taken different approaches to handling 
classes seeking injunctive and/or declaratory relief, as well as mone-
tary damages.164  These approaches were developed in light of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, which left 
unresolved the question of whether class actions with monetary dam-
ages could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).165  With the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s certification of the class in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, a third 
standard was adopted—the predominance standard.166 
In Dukes, the Supreme Court yet again granted certiorari on the 
issue of whether the absent class members in classes asserting mone-
tary damages on their behalf have a constitutional right to opt out of 
the class.  However, the Court has yet to render a decision on the is-
sue.167  Dukes presented an opportunity for the Court to step in to re-
solve the circuit split and provide guidance to future class actions.  
The Supreme Court explicitly addressed two of the existing circuit 
tests:  the Ninth Circuit’s predominance test and the Fifth Circuit’s 
incidental test.  The Court did not discuss the Second Circuit’s bal-
ancing test. 
 
164 See Daniels, supra note 31, at 500 (“[T]he constitutional rights of absent class members 
continue to create considerable controversy among the circuits, specifically in the area of 
opt-out rights concerning monetary damage claims.”). 
165 See supra Part I.C. 
166 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the Second 
Circuit’s “subjective intent” balancing test and the Fifth Circuit’s “incidental damages 
standard” in favor of a new approach that turns on whether or not monetary damages 
predominate over injunctive and declaratory relief), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011). 
167 The Supreme Court had previously granted certiorari on this issue in Adams v. Robertson, 
520 U.S. 83 (1997), and Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).  See supra Part 
I.C. 
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1. Ninth Circuit’s Predominance Test 
The Ninth Circuit created a three-way circuit split in the standard 
used to assess whether classes seeking both equitable relief and mon-
etary relief could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).168  The source of 
the Ninth Circuit’s standard was the Advisory Committee’s Note to 
Rule 23, which states that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases in 
which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly 
to money damages.”169  Relying on the dictionary definition of “pre-
dominate,” the Ninth Circuit formulated a new standard for assessing 
when classes seeking monetary relief could be certified under 
23(b)(2):  “[t]o be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) . . . a class must 
seek only monetary damages that are not superior in strength, influ-
ence, or authority to injunctive and declaratory relief.”170  The Su-
preme Court explicitly rejected this approach in Dukes.171 
2. Fifth Circuit’s Incidental Test 
Following Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit was 
the first appellate court to address the issue of classes seeking both 
equitable relief and monetary relief, doing so in Allison v. Citgo Petro-
leum Corp..172  The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that many circuits had 
taken the position that monetary relief is acceptable under Rule 
23(b)(2), so long as it does not predominate over other claims.173  
Recognizing that notice and opt-out rights were to be balanced 
against the “need and efficiency of a class action,” the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that:  “monetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class ac-
tions unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory re-
 
168 See Poon & Evanson, supra note 105, at 18, 20 (noting the three-way split between the 
Ninth Circuit’s new predominance test, the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test, and the Second 
Circuit’s balancing test). 
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1966); see also Dukes, 603 F.3d at 615 (quot-
ing FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1966)). 
170 Dukes, 603 F.3d at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
171 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011) (rejecting the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s approach and observing that in face of the challenges in determining backpay 
claims, the Ninth Circuit should not have imposed an “arbitrary limitation on class mem-
bership,” but instead should have concluded that the “backpay claims should not be certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2) at all”). 
172 Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Natasha Dasani, 
Note, Class Actions and the Interpretation of Monetary Damages Under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23(b)(2), 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 171–72 (2006) (discussing Allison and the devel-
opment of the incidental damages test). 
173 See Allison, 151 F.3d at 411 (collecting cases). 
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lief.”174  The Fifth Circuit defined incidental as “damages that flow di-
rectly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the 
basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.”175 
Importantly, the Fifth Circuit limited incidental damages to “those 
to which class members automatically would be entitled once liability 
to the class (or subclass) as a whole is established.”176  The Fifth Cir-
cuit clarified that “incidental damages should not require additional 
hearings” or “entail complex individualized determinations.”177  Prior 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, sev-
eral courts approved class certification under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 
23(b)(2) even though substantial monetary damages were requested, 
relying on the Fifth Circuit’s test.178 
The Supreme Court did not directly rule on the permissibility of 
the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test.179  However, in the cases addressing 
the impact of Dukes on certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, courts 
have concluded that Dukes overruled a portion of the Fifth Circuit’s 
incidental test.180  Courts in the Fifth Circuit read Dukes as clarifying 
the existing Fifth Circuit law interpreting the requirements of Rule 
23(b)(2).181  However, none of the cases deal with monetary damages 
 
174 Id. at 414–15. 
175 Id. at 415. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 See, e.g., Smith v. Crystian, 91 F. App’x 952, 954 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming mandatory class 
certification under (b)(1)(A) or (b)(2) even though there were substantial damages pre-
sent), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1089 (2005); see also Poon, supra note 105, at 20 (observing that 
several circuits follow the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test)  (citing Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of 
Rehab. & Corr., 435 F. 3d 639 (6th Cir. 2006); Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02–8057, 
2003 WL 355417 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2003); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F. 3d 807 (11th Cir. 
2001); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F. 3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
179 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011). 
180 See, e.g., FPX, LLC v. Google, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 543, 552 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (“In reaching this 
decision [in Dukes], the Supreme Court overruled, at least in part, Fifth Circuit precedent 
that claims for monetary relief are permissible in a(b)(2) [sic] class so long as injunctive 
or declaratory relief is the predominant relief sought.”); Morrow v. Washington, 277 
F.R.D. 172, 202 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (noting the same).  The Eastern District of Texas certi-
fied “a [Rule 23](b)(2) class for injunctive and declaratory relief” in Morrow, but noted 
that it did not need to resolve the question of monetary relief in connection with the 
23(b)(2) class because the claims in this case could not even satisfy the Allison standard.  
Morrow, 277 F.R.D. at 197, 203. 
181 M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, is one example of such a case.  675 F.3d 832, 845 (5th Cir. 
2012) (holding that the lower court “abused its discretion” in certifying a class under 
23(b)(2), and observing that the Fifth Circuit has interpreted 23(b)(2)’s provisions “to 
create two relevant requirements when a proposed class seeks classwide injunctive relief:  
(1) the class members must have been harmed in essentially the same way, . . . and (2) 
the injunctive relief sought must be specific” (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  The Fifth Circuit explained that Dukes elaborated on the requirements 
!
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falling within the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test, and consequently, the 
cases addressing class certification in the wake of Dukes can rely on 
the fact that the monetary damages would not have even satisfied 
Fifth Circuit law pre-Dukes.182 
Given the Supreme Court’s focus on the class-wide nature of the 
Rule 23(b)(2) damages, a narrowly construed interpretation of the 
incidental test likely would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
Rule 23(b)(2) interpretation.  Such a narrowly construed incidental 
test would require a class in which the monetary damages “flow di-
rectly from liability to the class as a whole.”183  However, it is not clear 
that this is true in many of the class actions seeking both equitable 
and monetary relief today.  One scholar argues that post-Dukes the 
Fifth Circuit’s incidental test may change to put more emphasis on 
whether the damages are individual than on whether they are inci-
dental.184  In light of the Supreme Court’s observation in dicta that 
due process may require notice and opt-out rights for a class seeking 
any monetary relief, the Fifth Circuit’s incidental test may not meet 
 
of Rule 23(b)(2):  “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory 
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class” and that for “[f]or a class 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2), ‘the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at 
once.’”  Id. (citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–58).  In Stukenberg, “[t]he proposed class 
[sought] at least twelve broad, classwide injunctions, which would require the district 
court to institute and oversee a complete overhaul of Texas’s foster care system.”  Id.  The 
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “some of the proposed class’s sub-claims could potential-
ly be certified under Rule 23(b)(2),” but ultimately found “that the proposed class claims 
[did] not satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) because they include[d] claims for individualized injunc-
tive relief,” which the Fifth Circuit found explicitly barred by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Dukes.  Id. at 846. 
182 See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, No. 6:01–2148, 2011 WL 5553829, 
at *7 (W.D. La. Nov. 9, 2011) (noting that the court’s “findings and conclu-
sions . . . [were] also influenced by a recent Supreme Court opinion[] [Dukes],” which 
“held that [Rule] 23(b)(2) precludes class treatment where monetary relief is not merely 
incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief that might be available” and that 
“[i]ndividualized monetary claims belong in . . .  Rule 23(b)(3)”); FPX, 276 F.R.D. at 550, 
553 (noting that “class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate [under Fifth 
Circuit law] where resolution of the claims at issue would require complex individualized 
determinations and numerous individualized hearings” and holding that the “individual-
ized nature of each class member’s . . . claim precludes certification under Rule 
23(b)(2)” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Altier v. Worley Catas-
trophe Response, LLC, Nos. 11–241 & 11–242, 2011 WL 3205229, at *10–11 (E.D. La. July 
26, 2011) (explaining that class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) was inappropriate be-
cause plaintiffs were not seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and were only seeking 
monetary relief, and relying on prior Fifth Circuit precedent while noting that “Dukes re-
cently clarified that Rule 23(b)(2) does not authorize a class action when individualized 
claims for monetary relief predominate”). 
183 Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted). 
184 See Coffee, supra note 163 (“[A]fter [Dukes], that ‘incidental’ standard may not survive 
and the focus may shift to whether the damages are ‘individualized’ or uniform.”).  
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the additional requirements of the Due Process Clause, as interpreted 
by the Dukes Court. 
3. Second Circuit’s Balancing Test 
The Second Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit’s bright-line test, 
and instead, in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., adopted 
an “ad-hoc balancing” test.185  This test assesses “whether [Rule 
23](b)(2) certification is appropriate in light of the relative im-
portance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and circum-
stances.”186  The Second Circuit’s test is more flexible than the Fifth 
Circuit’s test and focuses on whether the request for injunctive relief 
is a sham.187 
Robinson involved a Title VII class action alleging race discrimina-
tion and seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2), with both dispar-
ate impact claims and pattern-or-practice claims.188  Pattern-or-
practice claims are usually divided into a liability stage and a remedial 
stage.189  Individual relief, such as backpay or compensatory relief, 
sought in addition to class-wide relief, must be ascertained at the re-
medial stage.190  The Second Circuit held that the district court, on 
remand, should certify the “disparate impact claim for Rule 23(b)(2) 
class treatment” and evaluate “whether the pattern-or-practice dispar-
ate treatment claim [would be] appropriate” for Rule 23(b)(2) certi-
fication, given the standard the Second Circuit set forth in its opin-
 
185 Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).  The Se-
cond Circuit describes its ad-hoc balancing in the following manner: 
Although the assessment of whether injunctive or declaratory relief predominates 
will require an ad hoc balancing that will vary from case to case, before allowing 
(b)(2) certification a district court should, at a minimum, satisfy itself of the fol-
lowing:  (1) even in the absence of a possible monetary recovery, reasonable plain-
tiffs would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought; and 
(2) the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably necessary 
and appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on the merits.  Insignificant or 
sham requests for injunctive relief should not provide cover for (b)(2) certifica-
tion of claims that are brought essentially for monetary recovery. 
  Id. 
186 Id. at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
187 See id. 
188 Id. at 155. 
189 See id. at 158 (“Generally, a pattern-or-practice suit is divided into two phases:  liability and 
remedial.” (citation omitted)). 
190 See id. at 159 (“If individual relief such as back pay, front pay, or compensatory recovery is 
sought in addition to class-wide injunctive relief, the court must conduct the ‘remedial’ 
phase.”). 
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ion.191  If the district court found that Rule 23(b)(2) certification of 
the pattern-or-practice claim was inappropriate, the Second Circuit 
held that the district court should bifurcate the claim, per Rule 
23(c)(4), and certify the liability portion of the claim for Rule 
23(b)(2) class treatment.192 
In developing and applying the ad-hoc balancing test to the dis-
parate impact claims, the Second Circuit explicitly noted its concern 
with due process considerations for absent class members.193  With re-
gard to non-incidental monetary damages in Rule 23(b)(2) class ac-
tions, the Second Circuit observed that “due process may require the 
enhanced procedural protections of notice and opt out for absent 
class members,” and consequently, “certification of a claim for non-
incidental [monetary] damages under Rule 23(b)(2) poses a due 
process risk because this provision does not expressly afford the pro-
cedural protections of notice and opt out.”194  However, the Second 
Circuit held that the “due process risk posed by [Rule 23](b)(2) class 
certification of a claim for non-incidental [monetary] damages” 
could be eliminated by the district court affording notice and opt-out 
rights to absent class members in the portions of the proceeding 
where non-incidental monetary damages were involved, for example, 
the damages stage of a disparate impact claim under Title VII.195 
With regard to the bifurcation of the pattern-or-practice claim, the 
Second Circuit observed that “litigating the pattern-or-practice liabil-
ity phase for the class as a whole” reduces “the range of issues in dis-
pute and promote[s] judicial economy.”196  Thus, this eliminates the 
need for a separate trial with regard to liability during the individual 
proceedings in the damages phase of the trial.197  Plaintiffs enter this 
 
191 Id. at 154.  There is no subsequent district court opinion, and the case appears to have 
been settled.  See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 325 F. Supp. 2d 411, 413 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (allowing parties to reform the settlement agreement). 
192 Robinson, 267 F.3d at 154.  Bifurcation of the claim, in this context, means splitting the 
liability and damages portions of the claim.  For example, the first phase of the litigation 
would involve a trial on the issue of whether the defendant had displayed a pattern of dis-
criminatory behavior.  If the answer were determined to be yes, then there would be a se-
cond phase of the trial to determine damages. 
193 See id. 165 (“[W]e find that an ad hoc approach satisfies the very concerns that have led 
other courts to adopt the incidental damages standard—specifically, (1) achieving judi-
cial efficiency, and (2) ensuring due process for absent class members.” (emphasis added)). 
194 Id. at 165–66. 
195 Id. at 166. 
196 Id. at 168. 
197 Id. (explaining that if a Title VII defendant succeeds in the liability stage, then “the ques-
tion of whether it engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination that in-
jured its [minority] employees would be completely and finally determined, thereby elim-
inating entirely the need for a remedial stage inquiry on behalf of each class member”). 
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second phase with a presumption “in their favor ‘that any particular 
employment decision,’” was made pursuant to the discriminatory pol-
icy.198  The employer can rebut the presumption by showing that the 
adverse employment decision was made for lawful reasons.199 
The Supreme Court did not rule on the permissibility of the Se-
cond Circuit’s ad-hoc balancing test in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes.  
While several district courts in the Second Circuit have ruled on the 
certification of Rule 23(b)(2) classes following Dukes, the decisions do 
not explicitly address whether the Second Circuit’s ad-hoc balancing 
test survives.  In contrast, the decisions clearly indicate that the Se-
cond Circuit does not read Dukes as undermining a court’s ability to 
use Rule 23(c)(4) to certify issue classes. 
Most courts in the Second Circuit acknowledge that, at a mini-
mum, Dukes has overruled the Robinson ad-hoc balancing test to the 
extent that it would allow Rule 23(b)(2) certification in cases where 
the class seeks monetary relief that is more than incidental.200  How-
ever, in a case involving sex discrimination claims under Title VII, a 
district judge sitting in the Southern District of New York limited the 
prohibition of backpay in a Rule 23(b)(2) class only to those instances 
in which an individualized determination of backpay was necessary.201 
In the portion of the proceedings where Robinson certified inci-
dental monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2), Robinson advocated 
for the use of notice and opt-out rights for absent class members.202  
On the one hand, the notice and opt-out rights ameliorate, at least to 
 
198 Id. at 159 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977)). 
199 See Robinson, 267 F.3d at 159–60 (explaining that, once a class member qualifies for the 
liability stage presumption, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the 
employment decision was made for lawful reasons) (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362). 
200 See, e.g., Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2012 WL 1450553, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 23, 2012) (observing that “[b]oth the Second Circuit and this Court have followed 
the ‘predominates’ approach the Supreme Court rejected in Dukes”); Chen-Oster v. 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2012 WL 205875, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) 
(concluding that plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief were not incidental and thus could 
not be included in a Rule 23(b)(2) class); Easterling v. Conn. Dept. of Corr., 278 F.R.D. 
41, 45 (D. Conn. 2011) (observing that “the Supreme Court [in Dukes] rejected the Se-
cond Circuit’s broad reading of Rule 23(b)(2)”). 
201 See Cronas v. Willis Grp. Holdings, Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15295, 2011 WL 5007976, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ backpay claim does not require additional hearings 
to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s case, and neither introduce[s] new 
substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail[s] individualized determinations. . . .  In con-
trast to Wal-Mart, Defendants here have agreed in the Revised Proposed Consent Decree 
that the allocation of backpay to class members will be done by formula.” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
202 See Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165–66 (“[D]ue process may require the enhanced procedural 
protections of notice and opt out for absent class members.”). 
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some extent, the due process concerns with certifying monetary dam-
ages under Rule 23(b)(2).  Courts are authorized under Rule 
23(c)(2) to order notice to the class, for classes certified under 
23(b)(1) or (b)(2).203  However, there is no general right to opt out 
for the mandatory classes.204  On the other hand, the Supreme Court 
has stated, in dicta, that it may read Rule 23(b)(2) as inconsistent 
with monetary damages of any amount.205  If it were to so hold, then 
little would remain of Robinson’s advocacy for notice and opt-out 
rights in connection with certification of monetary damages under 
Rule 23(b)(2). 
Courts in the Second Circuit are open to the idea of certifying two 
classes, with one class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) seeking injunc-
tive relief and another certified under Rule 23(b)(3) seeking mone-
tary relief.  For example, in a case involving a refusal by Best Buy 
Stores to honor its price-match guarantee, a district judge sitting in 
the Southern District of New York held that classes certified in a bi-
furcated manner, with one class seeking injunctive relief certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2) and another class seeking monetary relief certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(3), were not impacted by Dukes.206  Subsequent 
decisions have relied on this decision to certify both a Rule 23(b)(2) 
injunctive class and a Rule 23(b)(3) monetary relief class.207  The class 
 
203 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
204 However, at least one court has ordered plaintiffs to do so, relying on its discretionary 
power.  See In re Conseco Life Ins. Co. Lifetrend Ins. Sales & Mktg. Litig., Nos. M 10–
02124, C 08–05746, C 10–00652, 2010 WL 5387793, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) (ob-
serving that the Court ordered “plaintiffs to provide class members with notice of [the] 
action and an opportunity to opt out” because of the concurrent regulatory settlement 
and leaving that order in place). 
205 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (observing that there is a “se-
rious possibility” that due process would require notice and opt-out rights in any class 
seeking monetary relief); see also supra Part I.C.2. 
206 See Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 173–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining 
that the “abrogation of Robinson does not affect certification in this case” because the 
(b)(2) class seeks “only an injunction against further statutory violations”).  The district 
judge did note the necessity of reexamining the issue of Rule 23(b)(2) certification in 
light of the fact that “Dukes’ second holding, concerning the effect of claims for monetary 
relief on the court’s certification of an injunction class under Rule 23(b)(2) [was] poten-
tially pertinent” because the Second “Circuit had long followed the ‘predominates’ ap-
proach rejected in Dukes.”  Id. at 173.  The district judge also found that the Second Cir-
cuit’s earlier decisions allowing certification of an injunction class under Rule 23(b)(2) 
and a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) were not undermined by Dukes.  Id. at 169. 
207 See, e.g., Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2012 WL 1450553, at *20–21 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2012) (certifying the class under both Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) after 
observing that recent precedent in the Southern District “establishes that when a district 
court engages in the analysis required under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3), a class 
!
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certified under Rule 23(b)(3) must satisfy the additional require-
ments imposed on those types of classes.208 
Further, the portion of the Robinson analysis pertaining to bifur-
cated claims appears to be in full vigor following Dukes.  Shortly after 
Dukes, a district judge sitting in the Eastern District of New York held 
that “[t]he Second Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4),” which 
“has consistently endorsed a broad reading of Rule 23(c)(4)” and its 
allowance of certification of issue classes, was “consistent with 
[Dukes’] interpretation of Rule 23(b).”209  Courts in the Second Cir-
cuit have followed this reasoning and have read Dukes as not cutting 
back on the authority granted in Rule 23(c)(4).210  Claims brought 
under Title VII are well suited to bifurcation, with an initial liability 
stage certified under Rule 23(b)(2), followed by a remedial stage.211 
 
can be certified seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages”) 
(citing Jermyn, 276 F.R.D. at 173). 
208 See Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553 at *21 (noting that, to be certified under Rule 26(b)(3), a 
class must also satisfy predominance and superiority requirements); Jermyn, 276 F.R.D. at 
173–74 (finding that the class satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and superiority 
requirements). 
209 United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 33–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that 
Dukes did not abolish Robinson insofar as Robinson addresses a court’s ability to certify issue 
classes pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) when only portions of the claim satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)). 
210 See, e.g., Maziarz v. Hous. Auth. of Vernon, 81 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1203, 1214, 1217 (D. Conn. 
2012) (commenting that “[w]here a class may be maintained with respect to particular is-
sues, . . .  the court is free to certify separate issues, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4), in order 
‘to reduce the range of disputed issues in complex litigation and achieve judicial efficien-
cies’” and granting motion for class certification pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)) 
(citing Robinson v. Metro–North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)), 
reconsideration denied (Mar. 14, 2012); Easterling v. Conn. Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.R.D. 41, 45 
(D. Conn. 2011) (“In Robinson, the Second Circuit exhorted district courts to take full ad-
vantage of [Rule 23(c)(4)] to certify separate issues in order to reduce the range of dis-
puted issues in complex litigation and achieve judicial efficiencies.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
211 See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2012 WL 205875, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (observing that “[t]he defendants overstate[d] Dukes’ reach” by 
arguing “that as a matter of law, the presence of the plaintiffs’ claims for individualized 
relief preclude[] certification of any portion of this case under Rule 23(b)(2)” because 
Rule 23(c)(4) allows class actions, when appropriate, to “be brought or main-
tained . . . with respect to particular issues”) (citation omitted).  The court goes on to ex-
plain that the question of individual relief in a Title VII case arises only after proof that 
an “employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination,” and that 
Title VII claims “therefore can be bifurcated into an initial stage at which the plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination and a separate remedial stage.”  Id.  
Observing that Second Circuit law encourages district courts to “take full advantage of 
[Rule 23(c)(4)] to certify separate issues in order to reduce the range of disputed issues 
in complex litigation and achieve judicial efficiencies,” the court concludes that 
“[d]isparate impact and pattern-or-practice disparate treatment cases are especially ap-
propriate for bifurcation precisely because . . . individual issues arise only if the class es-
tablished the employer’s liability.”  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
!
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As courts in the Second Circuit have observed, Dukes does not ad-
dress the ability of courts to split proceedings and certify classes un-
der both Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), or to bifurcate proceedings by 
certifying an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4).  Thus, at least within 
the Second Circuit, these two options remain available to judges con-
sidering class certification.  Those portions of the Robinson analysis 
are unaffected by Dukes. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF WAL-MART V. DUKES’ LIMITATION FOR MONETARY 
REMEDIES IN RULE 23(B)(2) CLASSES 
Ultimately, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes leaves unanswered the 
question of when monetary damages can be included, if ever, under 
Rule 23(b)(2).  The limitations the Supreme Court placed on mone-
tary remedies under Rule 23(b)(2) can be understood as being moti-
vated by underlying due process concerns, consistent with the histori-
cal assumption that courts would determine, on a case-by-case basis, 
the due process required for a particular Rule 23(b)(2) class action.  
Considering this, what are the best options for structuring a class ac-
tion that seeks both injunctive and monetary relief, as is typical in Ti-
tle VII employment discrimination cases?  What approaches to struc-
turing class actions can be taken that help address the due process 
concerns of both plaintiffs and defendants, but also provide a meas-
ure of certainty for the parties by setting clear expectations?  The ap-
proach taken in the subsequent Dukes litigation offers one example:  
the strategy so far has been to split the litigation regionally and sepa-
rate the classes into an injunction class seeking relief under Rule 
23(b)(2) and a damages class seeking relief under Rule 23(b)(3).  
Finally, two alternative approaches to address the due process con-
cerns underlying the certification of mandatory classes that involve 
monetary damages are briefly explored. 
A. Dukes Plaintiffs’ Litigation Strategy Moving Forward:  A Case Study 
The subsequent litigation in the Dukes case provides a case study 
of one approach to the concerns raised by the Supreme Court in 
 
ted).  The court found that “the plaintiffs plan to seek class certification pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(2) for the liability stage only” was “materially identical to that endorsed by the Se-
cond Circuit in Robinson and [thus] would be fully consistent with Dukes’ careful attention 
to the distinct procedural protections attending (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes.”  Id. at *8 (ci-
tation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Dukes.212  The Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint213 in the Califor-
nia litigation makes two key changes from the Third Amended Com-
plaint214 that formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision:  first, 
it brings the action on behalf of a much smaller, regionally-based 
class; second, it splits the class in two, with a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive 
relief class and a Rule 23(b)(3) monetary relief class.215 
This strategy appears consistent with the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing.  The injunctive relief class, consisting of women employed (or 
who will be employed) by Wal-Mart in the California Region, seeks 
only an injunction to prevent Wal-Mart’s alleged discriminatory em-
ployment practices and a declaratory judgment that Wal-Mart’s em-
ployment practices violate Title VII.216  This is consistent with both the 
historical roots of Rule 23(b)(2) classes that the Supreme Court em-
phasized in Dukes and the Supreme Court’s concern about whether 
any monetary relief could ever be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).  In 
 
212 While subsequent regional actions have been filed in California, Texas, Florida, and 
Tennessee, my discussion focuses solely on the California litigation as an illustrative ex-
ample.  See WAL-MART CLASS WEBSITE, http://www.walmartclass.com/public_home.html 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  On October 15, 2012, the Texas action was dismissed; the dis-
trict court held that the claims were “barred by the statute of limitations.”  See Margaret 
Cronin Fisk, Wal-Mart Wins Dismissal of Texas Women’s Class Action, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-15/wal-mart-wins-
dismissal-of-texas-women-s-class-action.  In late September, the California action survived 
Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss.  See WAL-MART CLASS WEBSITE, 
http://www.walmartclass.com/public_home.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
213 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 01-2252 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Fourth Amended Complaint]. 
214 Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 01-2252 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Third Amended Complaint]. 
215 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint seeks to certify two separate classes:  an “Injunctive 
Relief Class,” consisting of “all women who are currently employed or will be employed at 
any Wal-Mart retail store in a California Wal-Mart Region”; and a “Monetary Relief Class,” 
consisting of “all women employed at any Wal-Mart retail store in a California Region at 
any time from December 26, 1998.”  Fourth Amended Complaint at 4.  Plaintiffs argue 
that the Injunctive Relief Class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and that the 
Monetary Relief Class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3).  Id. at 5.  Alternatively, 
plaintiffs argue for using Rule 23(c)(4).  Id.  In contrast, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Com-
plaint sought to certify one class, consisting of “all past, present and future female em-
ployees of Wal-Mart’s retail stores . . . in the United States.”  Third Amended Complaint 
at 4.  Plaintiffs argued that the class could be properly certified under either Rule 
23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3).  Id.  Plaintiffs also argued that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) allows certifi-
cation, as an alternative.  Id.  The same approach was taken in the Texas regional class ac-
tions, with a small change in that the argument for Rule 23(c)(4) issue class certification 
was not listed as an alternative, it was simply listed alongside the Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 
23(b)(3) certification arguments.  See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and Jury De-
mand at 7, Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-02954-O (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2012) 
[hereinafter Texas Complaint]. 
216 Fourth Amended Complaint at 29, 32. 
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addition, this is consistent with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of 
Dukes as applied to splitting injunctive and monetary relief into two 
separate classes, with one certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and one un-
der Rule 23(b)(3), or using Rule 23(c)(4) to certify an issue class. 
The monetary relief class, consisting of women employed by Cali-
fornia-region Wal-Marts during the relevant time period, seeks all 
“back pay, front pay, general and specific damages for lost compensa-
tion and job benefits” that class members “would have received but 
for the discriminatory practices” of Wal-Mart.217  Plaintiffs also request 
“exemplary and punitive damages” for the monetary relief class.218  
This too is consistent with the Supreme Court’s limitations on reme-
dies available under the different subdivisions of Rule 23(b); howev-
er, the class may still have issues with the additional requirements of 
Rule 23(b)(3).219 
When rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s predominance test in Dukes, 
the Supreme Court expressed its concern that plaintiffs would add in 
claims for equitable relief in order to bypass the stricter requirements 
of Rule 23(b)(3).  This concern is not implicated here.  For one, the 
damages class still must meet the stricter requirements in Rule 
23(b)(3).  These plaintiffs will not be able to rely solely on a determi-
nation of liability in the injunction class because of Wal-Mart’s statu-
tory right to an individualized adjudication on the backpay claims; 
additional litigation to adjudicate Wal-Mart’s individual defenses will 
be necessary.  The issues common to both classes can be tried togeth-
er, without implicating the concern raised by the Supreme Court in 
Dukes that plaintiffs would be able to bypass Rule 23(b)(3)’s stricter 
requirements. 
In addition, this approach addresses the due process concerns 
discussed previously.  Since all monetary damages would be part of a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class, absent class members, for the class seeking mon-
etary relief, would receive notice and have the opportunity to opt out 
the litigation.  Furthermore, this approach increases the likelihood 
 
217 Fourth Amended Complaint at 31–32. 
218 Fourth Amended Complaint at 32.  The Third Amended Complaint requested all dam-
ages noted in the Fourth Amended Complaint, but also requested that class members be 
restored to the jobs and wages they would have had, but for Wal-Mart’s discriminatory 
practices.  Third Amended Complaint at 25.  The Fourth Amended Complaint is more 
modest in its approach, though still far-reaching, requesting that the injunctive relief in-
clude an assessment of job promotion processes and wages and “affirmative action to pro-
vide lost promotion opportunities” to the injunctive class members.  Fourth Amended 
Complaint at 32. 
219 Given this Comment’s focus on Rule 23(b)(2) remedies, I save that analysis for another 
Comment. 
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that absent class members will be adequately represented, since the 
class will not include both former and current employees of Wal-
Mart.  Thus, the approach taken in the subsequent litigation in the 
Dukes case appears to address the underlying due process concerns 
that likely motivated the Supreme Court’s limitation on monetary 
remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) classes. 
However, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certio-
rari in Comcast v. Behrand,220 the Northern District of California judge 
ordered the parties in Dukes to submit supplemental briefing on the 
impact of this case on the plaintiffs’ claims in Dukes.221  At a hearing in 
June 2012, Judge Breyer of the Northern District of California re-
portedly “signaled that plaintiffs could again fall short of showing that 
they have enough in common to sue the company as a class.”222  The 
primary obstacle plaintiffs face is “to allege class standing that [will] 
survive when tested against the language of the high court’s deci-
sion.”223  In that regard, Judge Breyer commented that he was “seri-
ously concerned [that] the plaintiff [had] not done so.”224 
These concerns appear to stem more from the requirements of 
Rule 23(a), and less so from Rule 23(b).  It is therefore possible that 
the approach taken in the subsequent Dukes cases will be found to 
adequately address the concerns raised by the Supreme Court.  How-
ever, the question certified in Comcast raises issues connected with 
what evidence must be shown at the certification stage to demon-
strate that a case is susceptible to having damages awarded on a class-
wide basis, and thus, the decision could impact the analysis in Dukes. 
 
220 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, No. 11-864, 2012 WL 113090 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (granting 
certiorari on the question of “[w]hether a district court may certify a class action without 
resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert 
testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide ba-
sis”).  Behrend involved an antitrust class action brought by customers alleging that Com-
cast obtained a monopoly and engaged in conduct to exclude competition, seeking certi-
fication under Rule 23(b)(3).  Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. granted in part, No. 11-864, 2012 WL 113090 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
221 Cynthia Foster, Judge Asks for More Briefing in Retooled Gender Bias Suit Against Wal-Mart, 
THE RECORDER (July 2, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202
561703936&Judge_Asks_for_More_Briefing_in_Retooled_Gender_Bias_Suit_Against_Wal
Mart. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
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B. Approaches Addressing Due Process Concerns in Rule 23(b)(2) Classes 
That Also Involve Monetary Damages 
The approach taken by the plaintiffs in the subsequent Dukes liti-
gation is one way to address the due process concerns entailed in cer-
tifying a class seeking monetary relief.  However, splitting the claims 
between two separate classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 
23(b)(3) is not the only solution.  From a policy level, what is the best 
way to structure a class action, when the class seeks a mix of injunctive 
and monetary relief?  How can that be done in a manner that balanc-
es the competing interests of ensuring that legitimate claims involv-
ing both forms of relief can be certified as a class, but also ensuring 
that certification does not become a quick way to force the defendant 
to settle?  The approach taken in Dukes, in the subsequent regional 
cases, attempts to find a middle line, which is consistent with how the 
Second Circuit views the class action landscape post-Dukes. 
In addition to that approach, two other approaches are explored 
below.  These approaches are offered more as a discussion-starter 
than a thorough treatment of the alternative approaches.  The first 
approach would offer a measure of certainty for both parties by ad-
dressing the underlying due process concerns via a rule amendment 
to Rule 23.  The second approach would offer courts more discretion 
and relies solely on the other existing provisions of Rule 23, specifi-
cally the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class.  Yet another way to approach this 
question is to consider the normative policies underlying Rule 
23(b)(2) and ask what types of monetary relief, if any, those policies 
support.225  For the purpose of the discussion below, this approach is 
not developed.  In thinking about all of these approaches, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that class actions are only one of several de-
vices to facilitate aggregate litigation, and there are other ways to 
achieve resolution of aggregate claims outside of Rule 23.226 
 
225 This strategy is developed in a recent article.  See Neil K. Gehlawat, Note, Monetary Damag-
es and the (b)(2) Class Action:  A Closer Look at Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1555 
(2012) (concluding “that while it might be problematic for courts to authorize compen-
satory damages in [Rule 23](b)(2) class actions, courts should be more willing to author-
ize backpay and punitive damages,” because “[w]hile compensatory damages are more 
individualized by nature, punitive damages and backpay are both inherently group reme-
dies” and “are aimed less at compensating individual plaintiffs and more at deterring de-
fendants’ wrongful behavior”).  For a more detailed discussion of this approach and the 
policy underlying Rule 23(b)(2), see Gehlawat’s article. 
226 For a discussion of some other devices in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that could 
be used as an alternative to Rule 23 class actions, see Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Ac-
tion Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475 (2005) (discussing Federal Rules of Civil 
!
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1. Amendment to Rule 23(b) to Create a Hybrid Class 
One option for addressing the due process concerns is simply to 
expand the protections afforded absent class members in Rule 
23(b)(3).  This would make certification much more difficult for 
plaintiffs seeking only injunctive or declaratory relief because all ab-
sent class members in Rule 23(b)(2) actions would be required to re-
ceive notice and have the opportunity to opt out of the litigation.  
Class certification would be more difficult because of the additional 
time and expense needed to identify and contact all of the absent 
class members.  Given that many Rule 23(b)(2) classes seek only in-
junctive or declaratory relief, this additional cost and time may result 
in a decrease of valuable claims. 
However, an alternative to prohibiting all monetary relief from 
classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in order to satisfy due process, 
or extending the protections afforded absent class members in Rule 
23(b)(3) actions to those in Rule 23(b)(2), is to create an intermedi-
ate “hybrid” class.  This approach would entail amending Rule 23 to 
create this new hybrid class.  The hybrid class would allow certifica-
tion of both equitable and monetary relief, but would require notice 
and the opportunity to opt out, similar to Rule 23(b)(3).  As an in-
termediary between the existing Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) classes, 
this new hybrid would not have a “predominance” test, but the mone-
tary damages would need to meet a strict interpretation of the Fifth 
Circuit’s incidental test.  Thus, under this new hybrid class, the mon-
etary damages would have to flow directly from the equitable relief to 
the class as a whole, with no individual determinations necessary.227 
The benefit of an amendment to Rule 23 is that it would provide 
certainty to plaintiffs and defendants.  It would allow for careful craft-
ing of a class that recognized the unique position of potential claim-
ants seeking relief under Title VII, or something similar.  There are 
two large downsides:  (1) it would be necessary to craft the hybrid 
class in such a way as to prevent claims that normally would be 
brought under Rule 23(b)(3) from sneaking into the new hybrid 
class because its requirements are less strict; and (2) it would be diffi-
cult to draft and approve the hybrid class, given the Supreme Court’s 
concerns that using the Ninth Circuit’s predominance test might al-
 
Procedure 20, 22, and 42).  In addition, Multi-District Litigation provides yet another al-
ternative.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
227 This approach is similar to the guidance provided in illustration 5 of  § 2.04 of Principles 
of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.  AM. LAW INST., supra note 26, § 2.04 illus. 5 (2010); see 
also discussion, supra note 119. 
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low classes to add in claims for injunctive relief that predominated 
over monetary claims, thereby bypassing Rule 23(b)(3)’s stricter re-
quirements.  Further, a rule amendment to this effect would seem to 
necessitate a reading of Rule 23(b)(2) to exclude any claims for 
monetary relief. 
2. Reliance on Rule 23(c)(4) Issue Classes 
Another approach is to expand the use of the Rule 23(c)(4) issue 
class and to encourage plaintiffs to take greater advantage of this ex-
isting provision.228  Rule 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, 
an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect 
to particular issues.”229  Professor Cabraser notes that the issue class 
has been “infrequently invoked, perhaps due to uncertainty as to how 
it is to be ‘construed and applied’” with regard to Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance analysis.230  The role of the court with respect to Rule 
23(c)(4) issue classes is to separate common issues from individual 
ones, certifying common issues for trial, and therefore allowing more 
efficient resolution of the common issues.231  The issue class could be 
used for cases like Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, allowing resolution of 
the common issues related to discrimination claims, while pulling out 
claims requiring individual determination for later adjudication.  In-
deed, both the California and Texas complaints in the subsequent 
Dukes litigation include an argument for certification of the common 
issues under Rule 23(c)(4) and thus, discretion by the courts as to 
what due process may be required in this instance.232 
This approach is, in some ways, more consistent with the underly-
ing due process concerns in Dukes because it leaves the court with 
significant discretion in determining when there are common issues 
suitable to certification under Rule 23(c)(4).  This discretion was the 
underlying theme in Professor’s Kaplan’s article discussing the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23.  However, this approach leaves both plain-
tiffs and defendants with much uncertainty as to how courts will ana-
lyze their particular case, given the discretion allocated to the court.  
While it is important that the decisions in the Second Circuit post-
 
228 The plaintiffs in Dukes relied on this rule in both complaints discussed in this Comment, 
as an alternative to certification under 23(b).  See Fourth Amended Complaint at 5; Texas 
Complaint at 7.  The Texas complaint relies on this as a primary claim, instead of relegat-
ing it to an alternative claim.  Texas Complaint at 7. 
229 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
230 Cabraser, supra note 226, at 1499. 
231 Cabraser, supra note 226, at 1501. 
232 Fourth Amended Complaint at 5; Texas Complaint at 7. 
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Dukes generally endorse this approach, there is the risk that the Su-
preme Court will decide that the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class is being 
used abusively or too opportunistically, leading it to cut back on this 
approach.233 
In addition, there may be some logistical issues to work through.  
Even when a particular issue, such as whether an employer had dis-
criminatory promotion policies, can be certified as a Rule 23(c)(4) 
issue class, that is only step one.  Presumably an employer would still 
be entitled to rebut each individual’s presumption of a discriminatory 
reason for an adverse employment action.  Thus, Rule 23(c)(4) issue 
class certification, while allowing for great discretion on the part of 
courts consistent with the due process concerns likely underlying 
Dukes, would not achieve the efficiencies ideally achieved by class ac-
tions.  Despite that, creative use of the issue class may be a way to help 
address some of the due process concerns underlying the certifica-
tion of classes involving both equitable and monetary claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes left unan-
swered the question of “whether there are any forms of ‘incidental’ 
monetary relief that are consistent with the interpretation of Rule 
23(b)(2) [that the Supreme Court] . . . announced and that comply 
with the Due Process Clause.”234  A close examination of the history of 
Rule 23 and the Supreme Court’s class action jurisprudence suggests 
that Rule 23(b)(2), as it exists and is applied, does not adequately 
protect the due process rights of absent class members when mone-
tary relief is sought in addition to equitable relief.  The Supreme 
Court’s approach in Dukes, considered in conjunction with Rule 23’s 
history and the existing judicial standards for certifying monetary 
damages in Rule 23(b)(2) classes, suggests that due process may re-
quire notice and opt-out rights for absent class members in actions 
seeking monetary damages.  But the Court’s lack of a complete pro-
hibition on claims for monetary relief in Rule 23(b)(2) classes is con-
 
233 Indeed, some read the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes as signaling that the Court 
would narrowly interpret Rule 23(c)(4).  See, e.g., James P. Muehlberger & Gregory K. 
Wu, Does ‘Wal-Mart’ doom expansive reading of rule authorizing class actions for ‘particular is-
sues’?, THE NAT’L LAW J. (July 11, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202562602715&Does_WalMart_doom_expansive_reading_of_rule
_authorizing_class_actions_for_particular_issues&slreturn=20120821095750 (positing 
that Dukes and other recent cases “signal that the Supreme Court would look with disfavor 
upon an expansive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)”). 
234 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011). 
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sistent with the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s implied as-
sumption that courts had the competence to determine the due pro-
cess required on a case-by-case basis for Rule 23(b)(2) classes.  Thus, 
while significant individualized monetary relief cannot be certified in 
a Rule 23(b)(2) class after the Court’s decision in Dukes, there may be 
other forms of monetary relief that nonetheless could be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2) consistent with the Due Process Clause. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the plaintiffs in Dukes 
adopted a regional strategy of splitting the litigation into two classes, 
one class seeking only injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), and the 
other class seeking monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3).  This ap-
proach appears to address the due process concerns likely motivating 
the Supreme Court in limiting the availability of monetary damages 
under Rule 23(b)(2).  In addition, this Comment briefly explored 
two alternative approaches:  an amendment to Rule 23 to create a 
new hybrid class and an expansion of the use of the Rule 23(c)(4) is-
sue class.  The first approach offers litigants some certainty in what is 
required for certification and how the court will analyze the proposed 
class.  The second approach is more consistent with the emphasis in 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 on a court having discretion to de-
termine what the Due Process Clause requires in any particular in-
stance; however, it provides very little certainty to litigants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
